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Abstract 
 
The study examines the impact of Egyptian political satire show, El Bernameg, upon 
young Egyptian viewers’ evaluation of Egyptian media figures. The significance of 
researching this topic comes from being the first of its kind in Egypt, combining both 
comedy and political discussions. In the form of a mock commentary, the program 
has tackled as well as lampooned a variety of political topics and public figures 
ranging from presidential candidates to government officials to media figures and 
even entertainers. The study particularly focused on the potential impact of El 
Bernameg’s metacoverage upon young Egyptian viewers, mainly when it comes to 
evaluating the role of prominent Egyptian media figures.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Purpose of the Study 
With the growing literature on quasi-news media, such as political 
entertainment shows, various scholars attempt to understand the potential effects 
of such medium upon viewers. Are they a mean to provide unpolished critiques of 
political corruptions, or are they an easy refuge for individuals to learn about news 
and politics minus the complexities of politics while being entertained?  
The study seeks to examine what influence El Bernameg TV Show, a 
political satire show, has upon young Egyptian viewers. The study particularly 
focuses on how young Egyptian viewers, upon watching El Bernameg TV Show, 
evaluate Egyptian media figures. The study will also examine if moderating 
factors, such as political knowledge and likability of the El Bernameg host, 
Bassem Youssef, may influence viewers’ evaluations. The study will utilize 
controlled experiment particularly a posttest control group design where the 
experimental stimuli will be a 15-minute montaged video clip of 2 episodes of El 
Bernameg, during its third season.  After exposure to the video clip, both groups 
were asked to answer a post-test questionnaire. The experimental research has no 
pre-test in order to avoid subject sensitization towards the post-test. A control 
group was utilized in the study to be compared to the experimental group in order 
to examine whether the causal hypotheses is an outcome from exposure to the 
experimental stimulus (El Bernmaeg clip) or not. 
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History of Political Satire in Egypt 
 
The earliest form of political satire in Egypt can be traced back to Pharaonic 
times found through bas-reliefs (Marsot, 1971). For centuries, Egypt had faced many 
hardships from oppressive rulers, poverty and disease, and besides that censorship 
was imposed by a government comprised of autocratic elitist who, in the words of 
Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot (1971), “did not speak the language of the population” 
(p.3). This in turn led Egyptians to criticize or ridicule the ruler and the impoverished 
conditions of the country through indirect methods by using satire (Marsot, 1971). 
Satire took on different forms in Egypt at different times and served as a means for 
the public to vent out their disdain towards their rulers at that time while avoiding any 
legal problems (Marsot, 1971). Besides, satire was not only used to mock rulers, but 
also during times of war to ridicule the enemy (Marsot, 1971). At first, satire was 
verbal rather than written due to the high rate of illiteracy of the Egyptian population 
(Marsot, 1971). Among the earliest forms of satire in Egypt were folk tales that were 
narrated at public gatherings and characterized as adventurous tales infused with 
social commentary, words of wisdom and morals (Marsot, 1971). Examples of such 
folk tales were: Abu Zaid El-Hilali, an Arab warrior, Antara Ibn-Shadad, an Arab 
warrior during pre-Islamic times, and the tales of Goha (Marsot, 1971).  Another form 
of satire were proverbs or folk sayings that are used in conversations to mock certain 
situations, for instance the following proverb can be used to express a society’s 
hierarchal system  “if you have any business with the dog call him master” (Marsot, 
1971, p. 5). The zajal is another form of satire which is a traditional form of oral 
strophic poetry that comprises of improvised descriptions or commentary and often 
recited with the accompaniment of music (Marsot, 1971). Eventually, the popularity 
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of the zajal declined during the nineteenth century, as songs became a popular 
medium for satire (Marsot, 1971).  One of the pioneers of merging social commentary 
into songs was Sheikh Salama Hijazi whom found that social commentary as more 
palatable in the form of song to the audience (Marsot, 1971). The nukta, or verbal 
joke, is another form of political satire (Marsot, 1971). Nuktas particularly are 
widespread in Egypt and appear under any circumstances whether at times of joy or 
even distress, Egyptians have resorted to the power of laughter and humor to help 
vent out their anger and despair, so in other words laughter served as “a safety valve,” 
as described by Marsot (1971) (p. 6). During the middle ages of the Umayyad & 
Fatimid dynasties in Egypt and the Middle East region, one form of satirizing the 
ruler involved translating Indian, Persian and Greek folk tales to Arabic whereby the 
characters of these tales would represent the rulers of that time. For example, 
following the Muslim conquest of Persia, the Panchatantra folks tale was translated 
into Arabic by Persian author Ibn al-Mukaffa’ and is known in Arabic as Kalilah w 
Dimnah which carries tales of wisdom told through animal fables (Mubeen,     ). 
Ibn al-Mukaffa’ expressed his hatred towards the Arab ruler of that time Sufy n bin 
Mu‛awiya and his supporters by indirectly making fun of them and likening them to 
the characters of Kalilah w Dimnah (Mubeen, 2008).  So a tale about the lion, or the 
king of the jungle, could carry hidden inferences about the ruler.  
In the 16
th
 century, the French invasion of Egypt (1798) introduced Egyptians 
to the printing press as well as theater. However, newspapers at that time were only 
read among a few due to poverty and illiteracy. In the mid-19
th
 century, the era of 
Khedive Ismail saw various intellectual reforms in attempt to modernize Egypt 
through education, journalism, theater and the arts (Marsot, 1971).  
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This period introduced two men who played an important role in developing 
satire in Egypt. The first is Egyptian journalist, author and poet, Abdullah El Nadim, 
who established a satirical newspaper called Al Tankit w al-Tabkit (Fun and Tears) 
where his writings were characterized as witty covert criticisms of Khedive Ismail 
and the government for their exploitations of Egyptian peasantry (Marsot, 1971). The 
second is Egyptian Jewish journalist, Yaqub Sanu’a, who is recognized for refining 
journalism and the art of theater as well as introducing the first satirical newspaper 
with cartoons in Egypt called Abu Nadara Zarqa (The Man with Blue Glasses) that 
used to mock political figures, British and French exploiters, and Khedive Ismail 
(Marsot, 1971). Even after Sanu’a’s exile to France, he kept publishing his newspaper 
(Marsot, 1971). However, after Sanu’a’s exile, the cartoon’s popularity began to wane 
and disappear in Egypt since the art of drawing itself was not popular in Egypt at that 
time (Marsot, 1971).  However, political satire cartoons regained popularity in Egypt 
through the satirical journal Al-Kashkul (The Notebook) in 1921, and Rose Al Yusuf 
magazine created by Egyptian actress and journalist Rose Al Yusuf in 1925 (Marsot, 
1971). Amongst renowned political satire caricaturists in Egypt was Egyptian-
Armenian Alexander Saroukhan who worked as a cartoonist for Rose Al Yusuf 
magazine and established the famous cartoon character Al Misri Effendi (The 
Egyptian Effendi) who represents the tribes and tribulations of the average Egyptian 
man. Egyptian poet, playwright, and cartoonist Salah Jahin is another prominent 
satirist whose famous work in political satire included his cartoons in Al Ahram 
Egyptian newspaper.   
Nowadays, Egypt has been exposed to new forms of political satire, for 
example stand-up comedy began to be a popular format for political humor in Egypt 
after its introduction through the Axis of Evil Comedy tour that featured Middle 
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Eastern comedians: Ahmed Ahmed, Maz Jobrani, Aron Kader, and Dean Obeidallah, 
who joked about their Middle-Eastern culture and their life changes in the US after 
the events of 9/11.  With the popularity of social media, Internet memes also became 
a widespread format for pop culture, social and political jokes in Egypt. Memes have 
been defined on Wikipedia as “an activity, concept, catchphrase or piece of media 
which spreads, often as mimicry, from person to person via the Internet” ("Meme", 
n.d.). Memes became popular in Egypt particularly after Egyptian Al Ahram 
newspaper modified an image of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak during 
the Middle East peace talks in 2010 to represent him at the front of the procession 
rather than US President Barrack Obama, this prompted Egyptians to create memes 
using photo-editing software Photoshop (York, 2012). One of the most famous 
Egyptian memes was titled as ‘The Guy Behind Omar Suleiman’ referring to the 
person who appeared behind former Egyptian vice-president Omar Suleiman during 
his speeches at the time of Egypt’s  5th of January revolution, who no one knew who 
he was at that time and sparked ridicule among Egyptians specifically for his 
obscurity and angry glare, and even had a Facebook page dedicated to him (York, 
  1 ). The events of Egypt’s  5th of January Revolution also independently produced 
political skits on Youtube, one of which were Bassem Youssef’s B+ Show that 
eventually was picked up for broadcast on Egyptian and Arab TV channels.  
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Background on El Bernameg TV Show 
 
El Bernameg (which is literally Arabic for “the program”) is an Egyptian 
political satire show, hosted by cardiac surgeon turned host and columnist Bassem 
Youssef. The show initially started in 2011 on YouTube (as The B+ Show) before 
being picked up for broadcast by Egyptian and Arab networks. The show’s 
beginnings can be attributed to the events of Egypt’s 25th of January Revolution 
that paved way for various independently produced political comedy shows on 
YouTube. Such shows were meant as a means to vent the public’s general disdain 
towards the Egyptian media’s poor performance in covering the events of the 
2011 Egyptian Revolution when the public could no longer depend on traditional 
news media for an objective coverage of the events. The show garnered wide 
success and many views that prompted Egyptian TV network, ONTV, to 
broadcast the show. The show draws inspiration from the US political satire show, 
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, to which it has been regularly compared. 
Similar to its US counterpart, the show discusses, and mocks, the shortcomings of 
public figures from different political spectrums and fields, from presidential 
candidates to government officials to media figures and even entertainers. 
The program has been considered the first of its kind in Egypt, combining 
both comedy and political discussions, covering a wide range of political topics 
with minimal to no boundaries, a matter that made the show widely praised or 
detested by the Egyptian audience. The show and its host had been frequently 
under fire and faced many legal issues. For instance, in 2013, Youssef received an 
arrest warrant for allegedly insulting then President Mohamed Morsi, and had to 
terminate its contract with two Egyptian channels due to their disagreement with 
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Youssef’s stance before landing airtime on the Middle East Broadcasting 
Corporation network’s MBC MASR in 2014. Nevertheless, the show’s success 
continued to flourish with Times magazine naming Bassem Youssef as one of the 
‘100 most influential people of the world’ in 2013, and was even interviewed by 
his idol, Jon Stewart himself. In her analysis of different episodes of Bassem 
Youssef’s El Bernameg TV show, Kelly Opdycke (2013) utilized Mark Orbe’s 
co-cultural theory and Kenneth Burke’s comic frame of acceptance in order to 
describe Youssef’s comedic style as well as how he voiced the concerns of 
oppressed groups in Egypt. Orbe’s co-cultural theory highlights how oppressed or 
muted groups communicate within divergent groups and found three ways of how 
oppressed groups deal with other groups through: assimilation, accommodation, 
or separation, and within these products, he divided the forms of communicating 
them into: nonassertive, assertive, or aggressive form (Opdycke, 2013). Those 
groups who create boundaries between them and other cultures fit into the 
nonassertive orientation, while groups who oppose other cultures fit within the 
aggressive orientation, and finally groups that try to inform other cultures about 
their own culture fit into the assertive orientation (Opdycke, 2013). Meanwhile, 
Burke’s comic frame of acceptance states that those who resort to comedy tend to 
see the different aspects of an issue rather than one side only (Opdycke, 2013). 
Therefore, on the basis of Orbe’s co-cultural theory and Burke’s comic frame of 
acceptance, Opdycke (2013) concluded that Youssef’s style follows aggressive 
assertive accommodation orientations. As of post Youssef’s venture in his El 
Bernameg TV show, he was chosen the Harvard Institute of Politics as a resident 
fellow (“Bassem Youssef joins Harvard,” 2015). He also hosted the 43rd 
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International Emmy Awards on the 23
rd
 of November 2015 (“Egypt’s Bassem 
Youssef to host Emmy Awards Gala,” 2015).   
 
Events in Egypt 
 
Egypt has undergone since the past five years tremendous changes in the 
political situation since the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 that took place on the 
25th of January 2011. The revolution was sparked by the Tunisian 2010 
revolution and was part of the Arab Spring (“Timeline of Egypt’s Revolution,” 
n.d.). The revolution who’s motto called for freedom and social justice came in 
protest against the shortcomings of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s 
regime, including: pervasive corruption, forged elections, state of emergency 
laws, police brutality, poor wages, and high unemployment among others 
(“Timeline of Egypt’s Revolution,” n.d.). The revolt coincided with the National 
Police Day where thousands of protestors from opposition groups and the public 
rallied to condemn the exploitations of the police among other (“Timeline of 
Egypt’s Revolution,” n.d.). The protests initially demanded the resignation of the 
Minister of Interior, the cancellation of the emergency law, the raise of minimum 
wage, and called for specified presidential term (“Timeline of Egypt’s 
Revolution,” n.d.). The protests were met with hostility by the authority that 
confronted them with police force and by impeding Internet and mobile phone and 
text communications (“Timeline of Egypt’s Revolution,” n.d.). Eventually, the 
neglection of Mubarak’s regime to the demands of the protesters increased their 
number to millions and led them to raise their demands to include the resignation 
of Mubarak and the overthrow of his government (“Timeline of Egypt’s 
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Revolution,” n.d.). The demonstrations lasted for 18 days and spread throughout 
different Egyptian governorates including Cairo, Alexandria, Ismai’lia, Suez and 
others (“Timeline of Egypt’s Revolution,” n.d.). Finally, the events of the 25th of 
January revolution ended with the announcement of the resignation of Mubarak 
on the 11th of February   11, and authority was handed to Egypt’s Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces (“Timeline of Egypt’s Revolution,” n.d.).  
Afterwards, Mohamed Morsi, a former leading member in The Muslim 
Brotherhood, was democratically elected as the President of Egypt on the 30th of 
June 2012. A year later marking the anniversary of his election, another uprising 
took place in Egypt on the 3 th of June   13, also known as ‘Tamarod 
Revolution’, calling for the Morsi’s resignation. The protests against Morsi 
resulted from his new constitution, which was drafted in only 10 days, and gave 
him complete power over the state’s judicial system (“Egypt timeline: from 
revolution to the current crisis,” n.d.). Furthermore, Morsi’s rule had been accused 
and opposed due to its increased authoritarianism and for pushing an Islamic 
agenda into his rule, as well as for the disregard of the demands from 25th of 
January Revolution system (“Egypt timeline: from revolution to the current 
crisis,” n.d.). The public’s dissent against Morsi’s government was also mobilized 
by a grassroots movement called Tamarod (Arabic for Rebellion) that was 
initiated by young Egyptians as a peaceful resistance method for registering 
people’s opposition against Morsi and their call for his resignation system (“Egypt 
timeline: from revolution to the current crisis,” n.d.). The protests of 30th of June 
ended with the announcement of General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, who was then head 
of the Egyptian Armed Forces, on the 3rd of July of the deposition of Morsi and 
his replacement with the head of the constitutional court, Adly Mansour, as the 
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interim President of Egypt until the Presidential Elections of 2014 system (“Egypt 
timeline: from revolution to the current crisis,” n.d.). Consequently, Morsi and 
many members of his government and from Islamist groups were detained, and 
The Muslim Brotherhood were classified as a terrorist group system (“Egypt 
timeline: from revolution to the current crisis,” n.d.). The aftermath of the 30th of 
June events led many pro-Morsi protestors for a sit-in at Raba’a Al-Adaweya 
Square that called for the return of Morsi as Egypt’s President and condemned the 
decision of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.  
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Literature Review  
 
Understanding the Audience of Political Entertainment Shows  
 
The Pew Research Center (2004a) found that a large portion of young 
Americans, ranging between ages 18 – 29, reported learning about the campaign 
and candidates from comedy TV programs such as The Daily Show and Saturday 
Night Live. The same age group depends less on traditional news media (such as 
network news and newspapers) in favor of comedy TV shows that cover politics. 
Adding that comedy shows are becoming regularly mentioned besides mainstream 
news media, such as network news programs and newspapers, as conduits for 
election campaign news (Pew Research Center, 2004a). This age group also 
reported that they learn new information that they haven’t previously known 
through comedy TV shows (Pew Research Center, 2004a). Another Pews 
Research Center (2004b) study also indicated that common viewers of The Daily 
Show comprise of younger viewers, falling much below the average age of 50+. 
Hollander’s (   5) study found that younger respondents were more likely to 
reference late night and comedy shows (such as Jay Leno and The Daily Show) as 
their source of political information. Furthermore, Hmielowski, Holbert and Lee’s 
(2007) research results showed that amongst their demographic measures, only 
age was a significant predictor to exposure to political satire TV shows. This 
shows that the younger the viewers, the higher the tendency of exposure to 
political satire TV shows, thus indicating that age is a powerful predictor for the 
choice of programs used to learn about political information.  
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Political knowledge was also shown as a key predictor to reported political 
learning from political entertainment shows. In another Pew study (2000), it was 
also shown that amongst people who commonly reported learning about campaign 
news (during 2000 US presidential elections) from late-night TV shows were 
young and people low on political knowledge.  
Referencing the uses and gratifications theory, Qin’s (    ) research 
found a significant difference between college students who are regular viewers of 
traditional broadcast news and those who are regular viewers of political comedy 
show (such as late-night comedy shows and The Daily Show) in terms of what 
they seek from their preferred media choices. Results from her study showed that 
students who prefer late-night comedy are more likely entertainment seekers (Qin, 
2008). This was indicated by their choices of gratifications sought from exposure 
to soft news, where their main choice was to fulfill pleasure and affective needs, 
followed by tension release and social integrative needs (Qin, 2008). While 
students who are regular viewers of traditional broadcast news are likely 
knowledge seekers (Qin, 2088). This was indicated by their sought gratifications 
from exposure to traditional broadcast news to which they scored higher in 
cognitive needs (such as acquiring information and understanding), followed by 
personal integrative needs and social integrative needs (Qin, 2008). Meanwhile, 
those who watch The Daily Show reported similar viewing needs as those who 
watch soft news programs, mainly for affective needs and relaxation (Qin, 2008). 
However, a minor difference was noted between both whereby viewers of The 
Daily Show also sought cognitive (information) needs, a matter that distinguishes 
The Daily Show’s regular viewers from soft news regular viewers since they don’t 
only seek to be entertained, but also seek knowledge (Qin, 2008). This finding 
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goes in line with the Pew Research Center (2004b) findings that indicate that 
regular viewers of The Daily Show are knowledgeable and equated their 
knowledge level to regular viewers of other political TV shows such as the 
O’Reilly Factor and the NewsHour. Hmielowski, Holbert and Lee (2007) study 
also showed that both variables that measured the need for humor, Need for 
Humor and Affinity for Political Humor, were shown to be positive predictors to 
exposure to political satire TV shows.  The Need for Humor measure in the 
context of Hmielowski et al. (2007) study refers to “the degree to which 
individuals seek out humor” (p. 1  ). Meanwhile, Hmielowski et al. (2007) 
measure of Affinity for Political Humor refers to the need for humor within 
political context.  
Concerning media use, Hmielowski et al. (2007) study found that frequent 
users of liberal cable TV news, situational comedies, and the internet were more 
likely to expose themselves to political satire TV shows. Hmielowski et al. (2007) 
attributed the reason behind the moderating role of exposure to liberal cable TV 
news towards political satire shows consumption due to different US liberal cable 
news programs (such as Hardball with Chris Matthews, Countdown with Keith 
Olbermann, and The Rachel Maddow Show) using the same satirical approach 
utilized in The Daily Show and The Colbert Report which can also serve the 
different political humor needs that the audience seek from political satire shows.  
In order to better understand the characteristics of each type of program 
and in an effort to show that the audience of every political entertainment shows 
have different characteristics, Young and Tisinger (2006) tested out possible 
predictors to political comedy shows’ viewing and individualized it to each 
program including Leno, Letterman and The Daily Show. When it comes to The 
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Daily Show audience, Young and Tisinger (2006) found the following as 
significant predictors to be highly associated to exposure to The Daily Show: 
younger, males, liberal, follow politics as well as well-acquainted in civics 
knowledge, and also use cable news (Young & Tisinger, 2006). Meanwhile, for 
Leno and Letterman audience, study’s analysis found that younger and local news 
consumers are more likely to follow both shows (Young & Tisinger, 2006). 
Besides, the study revealed that Letterman’s audience appeared to slightly be 
more educated than non-viewers (Young & Tisinger, 2006). 
 
Content of Political Comedy Shows  
 
Various literatures that tackled the topic of political entertainment shows 
also examined the content of the shows exhibiting different results depending on 
the types of jokes employed by the program. For instance, in an attempt to 
investigate the “public role” of political entertainment shows, Brewer and 
Marquardt (2007) examined the content of The Daily Show in terms of what topics 
are covered in the program, particularly political topics (p. 250). Results showed 
that more than half of the show’s news stories (56%) were about politics, with 
former US President George Bush being the main target of Stewart’s jokes 
(Brewer & Marquardt, 2007). The study also found that the show ridiculed 
various US political figures including prominent as well as less prominent figures 
ranging from presidential associates, cabinet officials, members of the congress, 
etc. which is a feature that Brewer and Marquardt (2007) described as unique to 
The Daily Show. As pointed by M.A. Baum, the inclusion of less prominent 
figures in The Daily Show makes the program stand out from other US political 
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entertainment shows, such as The Tonight Show, The Late Show, and Late Night, 
where hosts typically target more familiar political figures to the public in order 
for them to understand what they’re talking about (as cited in Brewer & 
Marquardt, 2007).  
Out of The Daily Show’s political news stories, a big portion of the show 
used Issue Framing (which is concentrating political discussions to policy 
subjects), addressing various policy topics such as the war on Iraq and social 
security among others (Brewer & Marquardt, 2007). Almost half of the stories 
covered world affair topics, while metacoverage (or coverage of the news media) 
received less reporting (15%) in the program (Brewer & Marquardt, 2007). 
Brewer and Marquardt (2007) noted in their study, in accordance with previous 
studies and Jon Stewart himself, The Daily Show does use recycled news material 
for the purpose of adding his own interpretation or criticism to the original 
footage. Not only does the show scrutinize the news media’s role, but it also 
criticizes how government and politicians may influence the media in their favor 
(Brewer & Marquardt, 2007). In terms of guest interviews, Brewer & Marquardt’s 
(2007) content analysis showed that the show featured wide range of guests from 
various fields including: political figures, news media personnel, as well as 
authors and entertainers.  
Content analysis of other late-night comedy shows exhibited different 
results from the content of The Daily Show, as results of Young’s (   4) content 
analysis on late-night comedy shows (particularly Leno and Letterman). During 
the 2000 US presidential elections, analysis showed that their jokes focused on the 
shortcomings of presidential candidates (George Bush and Al Gore), primarily 
concentrating on their personal traits than their policy positions, commonly 
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personifying Bush as unintelligent and Gore as dull, untrustworthy, and 
exaggerating (Young, 2004).  
Matthes and Rauchfleisch (2013) research on Swiss political entertainment 
program Giacobbo/Müller indicated that the show’s jokes mainly focus on issue 
frames (or policy topics). Even when targeting political figures, it critiques their 
policy stances more than their personal traits (Matthes and Rauchfleisch, 2013).   
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The Power of Humor (Theoretical Frame Work)  
 
Many scholars in different fields have been intrigued by the extent the humor 
appeal can be efficacious to which various studies arrived to disparate results. For 
instance, an intense review of past literature in the fields of advertising, marketing and 
education showed that using humor did help enhance attention (Sternthal and Craig, 
1973; Weinberger and Gulas, 199 ). However when it comes to humor’s impact upon 
attitude, a closer inspection on past studies on the effects of humor on persuasion 
concluded that a humorous approach had no significant advantage upon the message 
over a serious approach (Sternthal and Craig, 1973). While Weinberger and Gulas’s 
(1992) examination of past literature in the field of advertising concluded that the 
effects of humor on persuasion yielded mixed results, and that was particularly true 
when testing for moderating factors, such as gender and prior brand attitudes. Studies 
in the field of satire and political humor shows don’t fall short from speculating the 
effectiveness of humor, as results are inconclusive. Apart from the general debate on 
the effectiveness of humor, scholars have argued on how humor is processed when 
used in a political context, will it trigger affective based evaluations such as the case 
with humor in advertisements, or will it require high cognitive effort and pre-
knowledge of the discussed topics in order to understand the joke? On one hand, some 
scholars argued that delivering a message within a humorous framework eases the 
learning process for the viewer and that can result in incidental learning (as will 
further be elaborated in the study). On the other hand, other scholars argued against 
the notion that comedy and entertainment programs require only “mindless viewing,” 
and negotiated that comedy and entertainment shows do require, as stated by Qin 
(2008), “qualified political sophistication, cognitive ability and motivation for 
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audiences to participate and actively engage in the humor” (p. 3). Young (2004) 
related the observation that political entertainment program jokes requires active 
audience participation to the incongruity theory of humor that states that jokes employ 
two incompatible “frames of reference” which in order for the audience to understand 
requires them to use suitable cognitive rules to connect and relate these references (p. 
3 – 4). Similarly, based on the notion that political parodies illicit negative evaluations 
when judging political figures, Matthes and Rauchfleisch (2013) argued that in order 
for the content to prime negative evaluations from viewers, they need to be well 
acquainted with the event itself, therefore requiring high political knowledge on the 
behalf of viewers.  
When it comes to studies assessing the persuasive effects of humor, various 
studies referenced the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; 
Baumgartner & Morris, 2008; Young, 2004; Polk, Young & Holbert, 2009). The 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) is a dual-processing theory that attempts to 
explain how attitudes are formed and changed as an outcome of persuasion. Petty and 
Cacioppo (1986) developed the ELM theory during the early 1980s whereby they 
argued that persuasion doesn’t necessarily occur during high involvement with the 
stimulus, but it can also occur during low involvement. They explained that 
persuasive communications are processed, or elaborated, under either one of the two 
routes of persuasion: central or peripheral (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The central 
route requires the receiver to critically analyze and process the message. Petty, Briñol, 
and Priester (2009) noted however that message processing (attitude change) that 
occurs through the central route and utilizes high cognitive effort does not necessarily 
mean that the attitude formed is a rational one as it can easily be contaminated by an 
individual’s own predispositions such as a person’s emotion or previously held 
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attitudes and information. Petty, Briñol, and Priester (2009) explained that attitudes 
formed through the central route get incorporated into the receiver’s mental structure 
(define) and share distinctive characteristics as they become “easy to access from the 
memory, held with high confidence, persistent over time, predictive of behavior, and 
resistant to change until they are challenged by convincing contrary information” (p. 
134).  
However, the strenuous cognitive effort required to process media content 
through the central route is impossible to perform at all times, therefore people 
sometimes resort to making judgments based on heuristic cues. Likewise, when an 
individual is low on motivation and ability to process issue-relevant information, 
message processing is then likely to occur in the peripheral route (Petty, Briñol & 
Priester, 2009). The peripheral route requires less cognitive effort and, as explained 
by Baumgartner and Morris (    ), “message processing is dependent on various 
contextual and affective considerations, including the mood of the receiver” (p. 6 5). 
Similar to attitudes formed though the central route, attitudes formed through the 
peripheral route also share common characteristics, however, contrary to central route 
processing, they tend to be “less accessible, enduring, and resistant to subsequent 
attacking messages” (Petty, Briñol & Priester,    9, p. 135). However, studies have 
shown that on the long run, affective based judgments can disintegrate leaving behind 
issue-relevant persuasion, and one example of such phenomenon is the “sleeper 
effect” whereby discounting cues delay the persuasive impact of a message initially 
but over time the issue-relevant persuasion will persist (Petty, Briñol & Priester, 2009, 
p. 135). On the basis of the ELM theory, Petty, Briñol, and Priester (2009) explained 
that such effect could take place when the initial message has strong arguments that 
prompt to critically process the message, but later discounted it; however, over the 
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course of time the discounting effect from the peripheral route disintegrates and the 
persuasive impact of the strong arguments of the message reemerge.  
An individual’s elaboration depends on both motivation and ability to process 
the argument and determines which route of persuasion (central or peripheral) the 
person will utilize (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Polk, Young and Holbert (2009) further 
elaborated on how people’s level of motivation and ability to process can act as 
indicators to which persuasion route they’ll use in order to process the message by 
explaining:  
 
People with high motivation (determined by personal relevance, need for 
cognition, personal responsibility, etc.) and ability to process (determined by 
level of distraction, repetition, prior knowledge, etc.) are more likely to 
cognitively elaborate on messages (central route to persuasion), whereas 
people with low motivation and/or low ability to are less likely to cognitively 
elaborate (p. 205).  
 
The ELM theory posits that there are variables that can affect an individual’s 
motivation and ability to process a message. Among variables that help enhance 
motivation towards message processing is the perceived personal relevance of the 
message (Petty, Briñol & Priester, 2009). An enhanced sense of personal involvement 
towards a message can help enhance persuasion towards strong arguments, yet reduce 
persuasion towards weak arguments (Petty, Briñol & Priester, 2009). Petty, Briñol, 
and Priester (2009) suggested that by using second person pronouns (i.e. you) when 
addressing a message rather than third person pronouns (e.g. he or she) can increase 
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the persuasive effect of communications with strong arguments, yet reduce persuasion 
in communications with weak arguments (Petty, Briñol & Priester, 2009). 
Additionally, framing a message in accordance with people’s principles or 
self-conceptions can also enhance message elaboration, in other words if the receiver 
can relate to the premise of a communication he is likely to be persuaded by it (Petty, 
Briñol & Priester,    9). Furthermore, the degree of the source’s trustworthiness can 
influence a receiver’s message elaboration, as a study by Priester and Petty (1995) 
found that elaboration increased when the source was perceived as untrustworthy and 
vice versa (as cited by Petty, Briñol & Priester,    9). Cacioppo and Petty’s (19  ) 
study found that people who were low cognitive thinkers were particularly promoted 
to elaborate the message when they perceived the source as untrustworthy, while no 
difference was found with people who were high cognitive thinkers when it comes to 
message processing regardless of the degree of the source’s trustworthiness (as cited 
by Petty, Briñol & Priester,    9). Recipient’s are also more likely to elaborate a 
message if the host or topic was part of a stigmatized group (such as minority groups) 
rather than if the host or topic were not part of a stigmatized group, and that effect 
was particularly true for those recipients who are low on prejudice which Petty, 
Briñol, and Priester (2009) attributed to their concern that stigmatized groups are 
fairly treated and not misrepresented. Several studies have shown that unmotivated 
individuals are likely to process a message if its key arguments are summarized in a 
question form rather than as an assertion (Petty, Briñol & Priester, 2009). Elaboration 
towards a message can also be encouraged by having multiple sources present 
independent analyses of the issue (Petty, Briñol & Priester, 2009). 
Processing through the central route requires both motivation as well as the 
ability to do so, therefore some of the variables suggested by Petty, Briñol, and 
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Priester (2009) to enhance ability to elaborate the content of a message include: 
Repetition of a message can help enhance persuasion towards the message if the 
arguments are strong; in contrast, multiple exposure to weak arguments can lead to 
counterargument. Different media channels can have different effect on individuals’ 
ability to elaborate a message, Petty, Briñol, and Priester (2009) stated that people 
generally are better able to process messages in media that allow self-pacing  (such as 
magazines and the internet) than media that are externally controlled (such as 
television).  
Petty, Briñol and Priester (2009) explained that the ELM posits that receivers 
may process a communication at varying levels of elaboration that can range from 
high elaboration (e.g. high personal relevance, high knowledge, the message is easy to 
comprehend, no message distractions, etc.), low elaboration (e.g. low personal 
relevance, low knowledge, the message is complex to comprehend, message 
distractions, etc.), or even moderate elaboration (e.g. uncertain personal relevance, 
moderate knowledge, moderate complexity, etc.) (Petty, Briñol & Priester, 2009). 
Petty, Briñol and Priester (2009) tackled the multiple roles that variables can 
affect message elaboration, whereby variables refer to factors that can enhance or 
inhibit persuasion, amongst them: source factors, message factors, and recipient 
factors.  
When it comes to source factors, Petty, Briñol and Priester (2009) explained 
that at moderate elaboration conditions, recipients tend to look out for the expertise 
and attractiveness of the source (the host) to determine how much thinking they will 
expend upon the message. Therefore, highly expert and likable sources were likely to 
enhance message processing and in turn persuasion towards the message than sources 
that were low on expertise and likability particularly when the message arguments 
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were strong. The opposite was true when message arguments were weak that lowered 
message processing and persuasion (Petty, Briñol & Priester, 2009). Furthermore, at 
high elaboration conditions, a source can enhance message persuasion if it is relevant 
to the premise of the message, for example: an ad for a beauty product endorsed by an 
appealing source can serve as a visual support for its efficiency (Petty, Briñol & 
Priester, 2009).  
Petty, Briñol and Priester’s (   9) added that under high elaboration, when 
recipients are exposed to an ambiguous message, source expertise can bias their 
attitudes since they are more likely to favorable evaluate the message if the source is 
an expert. Meanwhile, source expertise did not have an impact on message receivers 
when they were under low elaboration, or if they deemed the message topic 
unimportant or uninteresting (Petty, Briñol & Priester, 2009).  
Petty, Briñol and Priester’s (   9) explained how the message itself can act as 
a variable to the degree of message elaboration. One example of that would be 
“matching” or targeting the message to the characteristics of the audience, such as 
their personality, gender, race, and so on (Petty, Briñol & Priester, 2009, p. 144). 
While the common notion theorizes that matching or targeting a message towards the 
intended audience will likely enhance persuasion towards the message, however ELM 
explains that this is not always the outcome (Petty, Briñol & Priester, 2009).  
One example of individual traits that a message can target would be an 
individual’s self-monitoring whereby high self-monitoring refers to individuals who 
seek social acceptance, while low self-monitoring refers to those who seek to be true 
to their own held values and beliefs. Petty, Briñol and Priester’s (   9) noted, in 
reference to past studies, that targeting a message to receivers’ self-monitoring can 
render a message more persuasive. An example of such outcome was noted in a 
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research by Snyder and DeBono (1985), which showed that people with high self-
monitoring were more influenced by the message with quality content, while people 
with low self-monitoring were appealed by messages that resonated with their own 
held values and beliefs (as cited in Petty, Briñol & Priester, 2009).   
Petty, Briñol and Priester’s (   9) explained that according to the ELM, under 
low elaboration conditions, people tend to look out for the peripheral cues in the 
message and one example of that would be “classical conditioning” attitude effect 
which is likely to occur when the elaboration is low (p. 146).  
Emotions can also affect message processing, as Petty, Briñol and Priester’s 
(2009) remarked that happy people are likely than sad people to process messages 
they find enjoyment from processing. Conversely, when there is no deemed 
enjoyment from message processing, this will likely attract sad people rather than 
happy people because sadness helps put them in a situation that prompts them to solve 
their issues (Petty, Briñol & Priester, 2009).  
At high elaboration, the ELM posits that people’s emotions can affect their 
attitudes by affecting the type of thoughts that come into mind. As studies have shown 
that positive messages tend to be more accessible in people’s minds when they are in 
a happy state, and vice versa (Petty, Briñol & Priester, 2009).  
Thereby Petty, Briñol, and Priester (2009) concluded that in terms of the 
impact of people’s emotions towards their perception of communications, positive 
communications are likely to be more efficient when they target people in their happy 
states, while negative communications are likely to be more efficient when they target 
people in their sad states.  
Both motivation and ability to process a message are two factors that 
form the basis of the Elaboration Likelihood Model process (Petty & Caccioppo, 
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1986). On that premise, Polk, Young, and Holbert’s (2009) study on the effects of 
different types of humor upon receivers’ argument scrutiny has demonstrated 
that higher levels of motivation do enhance individuals’ drive to counterargue. In 
the same study, researchers assumed that an individual’s ability to counterargue 
can also take the form of an individual’s internal efficacy since a person’s ability 
to scrutinize can come from their trust in their own political judgments (Polk, 
Young & Holbert, 2009). Polk, Young, and Holbert’s (2009) study demonstrated 
that individuals’ internal efficacy, as one form of their own ability to process a 
message, can have an impact upon their tendency to countergarue based on the 
degree of the message’s complexity as the study found that participants with 
high internal efficacy provided fewer counterarguments when exposed to 
sarcastic humor, that represents the simple type of humor, but provided 
numerous counterarguments when exposed to irony, that represents a complex 
type of humor. On the other hand, participants with low internal efficacy 
provided more counterarguments towards the simpler type of humor (sarcasm) 
than the complex type of humor (irony) (Polk, Young & Holbert, 2009).   
Besides, the type of the argument itself determines which persuasion route 
will be used as well as whether the message will be persuasive or not (Polk, Young 
and Holbert, 2009). Therefore, under the central route, upon exposure to weak 
arguments, the message is likely to be rendered as less persuasive and the person will 
likely divert and reject any of its claims which in turn enhances the likelihood for 
counterargument, and vice versa (Polk, Young and Holbert, 2009). In that sense, 
persuasion, in case of central processing, is dependent on argument quality (Polk, 
Young and Holbert, 2009). However, when the message is being processed under the 
peripheral route, the likelihood of a message being persuasive is dependent on 
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heuristic cues (e.g.: an attractive source) that induce emotional or affective based 
evaluations (Polk, Young and Holbert, 2009).  
Baumgartner (2007) further elaborated in their research how the use of humor 
appeal could have a persuasive impact upon the receiver. First, humor can put the 
receiver in a positive mood and therefore is likely to agree with the message instead 
of arguing against it (Baumgartner, 2007). Second, appreciation of the humor itself, 
rather than the receiver’s mood, can result in reducing counterargument 
(Baumgartner, 2007). Finally, humor can increase the likability and trustworthiness of 
the source, which in turn can make the receiver agree with the message (Baumgartner, 
2007). 
Henceforth, it is assumed that humorous messages are likely to be processed 
in the peripheral route based on the affective impact they can have on some viewers.  
On a similar note, humor evocation was shown to have an impact upon the 
source (or the host) likability and credibility. In Nabi, Gusé and Byrne’s (   7) study, 
results indicated that humor is positively associated with both source liking and 
credibility, showing that the funnier respondents perceived the message, the more the 
TV host (or comedian) was considered likable and credible. This postulation also held 
true when comparing between humorous & serious messages upon source’s 
likeability and credibility (Nabi et al., 2007). Besides, Nabi et al. (2007) also found 
that familiarity with the source had an impact on his/her likability and credibility as 
respondents, upon identifying the host as comedian Chris Rock, were more likely to 
highly rate him more than an unidentified source.  
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The Effects of Political Entertainment Shows  
 
Political Knowledge – Scholars also took interest into examining the 
cognitive impact of exposure to political entertainment shows upon viewers, 
particularly focusing on viewers with low political knowledge. In terms of 
political knowledge, Qin (2008) showed that both experimental groups who were 
exposed to a segment from The Daily Show and a network TV newscast (CNN) 
scored higher in the political knowledge test. However, those who were 
particularly exposed to The Daily Show scored even higher than those who were 
exposed to the regular TV newscast (Qin, 2008). This implies that incidental 
learning is likely to take place while watching political entertainment shows, in 
which case people watching a program initially to be entertained can acquire 
political knowledge in the process (Qin, 2008). Qin (2008) attributed this finding 
to the effectiveness of humor that can render the transmitted information 
“persuasive and memorable” (p. 39). Furthermore, Qin’s (    ) study found four 
predictors of knowledge acquisition: attention to TV news, political involvement 
of an individual, exposure to The Daily Show or regular TV newscast (CNN), and 
gender. In terms of how delivering political information via entertainment can 
ease knowledge transmission (specifically for apolitical viewers), Xenos and 
Becker (2009) explained that humor lowers the cognitive costs required to learn 
about politics. This in turn facilitates processing similar political content within 
traditional news sources through the process of priming whereby comedy can 
render political topics as easily accessible within the viewers’ minds (Xenos & 
Becker, 2009). However, with such findings showcasing the impact of exposure to 
political comedy shows upon political knowledge, some scholars (identify who) 
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have argued that political entertainment can only act as a “news enhancer” rather 
than a “news supplement” (Xenos & Becker,    9, p. 320). This indicates that 
political issues discussed within a comedic frame can only present watered down 
synopsis about the political world rather than a provider of detailed political 
information (Xenos & Becker, 2009).       
Other studies examined how exposure to political comedy shows can 
impact political information seeking. For example, Xenos and Becker (2009) 
focused on how exposure to political comedy ties up with political knowledge 
acquisition by measuring its impact on active political information seeking (via 
Internet), and also if it enhances viewers’ attention towards its political content. 
Xenos and Becker (2009) experimental study showed that exposure to political 
comedy shows did enhance subsequent attentiveness to news media content that 
was investigated through tracking participants’ web searching activities after 
initially being exposed to different experimental conditions about US foreign 
policy. In terms of exposure time, participants who were exposed to the comedy 
clip (from The Daily Show) spent more time searching online for information 
about Iraq and foreign policy information compared to the rest of the experimental 
conditions (Xenos & Becker, 2009). These results were particularly true for those 
who were less interested in politics, as research analysis revealed that they have 
higher probability of searching online for foreign policy information than those 
participants with low political interests who were exposed to the network news 
clip, while it even had a lesser impact upon those who held strong political 
interests (Xenos and Becker, 2009). Hollander’s (   5) study expanded on the 
topic of how far exposure to entertainment-based programs affects attention 
towards the message by examining these two variables: recall and recognition. 
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Recall refers to high involvement and interest towards the message, an act 
commonly associated with the process of learning, which requires high cognitive 
effort as well as motivation to extract useful information, while recognition refers 
to low interest/involvement towards the message (Hollander, 2005). For late night 
shows (such as Jay Leno and David Letterman), Hollander’s (   5) study 
indicated that exposure to late-night shows were negatively related to recalling 
campaign information, but found a positive relation between late night show 
viewing and recognition.  
On a different note, Kim and Vishak (2008) approached the study of 
effects of news versus entertainment media differently by examining the 
information processing patterns induced by watching either type of medium that 
in turn underlies how viewers base their political judgments. Kim and Vishak’s 
(2008) study focused on two information-processing models: memory-based and 
online-based. Memory-based information processing is defined as when certain 
information bits are retrieved from the long-term memory to the temporal memory 
and is utilized to help form a judgment (in this case political judgment) (Kim & 
Vishak, 2008). While online-based information processing occurs when 
individuals base their political judgments on impressions or summary of affective 
evaluations rather than recalled information from the long-term memory (Kim & 
Vishak, 2008). The study measured online tally by adding the sum of participants’ 
evaluative ratings of all the content they were exposed to from the medium, 
including: issues, procedures, and political figures/groups regarding the focal 
thematic topic of the experimental research (which was about the US Supreme 
Court Justice and Chief Justice nominations) (Kim & Vishak, 2008). 
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Generally, the study’s experimental results showed that exposure to both 
the news and entertainment media significantly enhanced political knowledge 
acquisition when compared to watching neither (control group), though to varying 
degrees (Kim & Vishak, 2008). Firstly, study results showed that news media tend 
to boost recall of political information, both factual and opinionated, compared to 
entertainment media (Kim & Vishak, 2008). Consequently, study findings have 
also shown that news media induces memory-based information processing when 
it comes to making political evaluations (Kim & Vishak, 2008). This means that 
participants under the news media experimental condition strongly based their 
political judgments (in the case of the study, it was based on evaluating political 
actors) on their recall of political information that was prompted by their exposure 
to the news media (Kim and Vishak, 2008). Meanwhile, entertainment media was 
shown to promote online-based information processing whereby results indicated 
that participants, under the entertainment media condition, based their political 
judgments upon their online tally rather than on recall of political information, in 
other words, their political judgments were based on impressionistic evaluations 
(Kim and Vishak, 2008). It is notworthy to mention that Kim and Vishak’s (    ) 
findings closely relate to the Elaboration Likelihood Model, with memory-based 
information processing representing the central route and online-based 
information processing representing the peripheral route, and further supports the 
proposition that humor is processed through the peripheral route.   
While many studies argued that the dependence on political comedy shows 
for political knowledge and information is insufficient to form political 
judgments, other scholars argued against this notion. As notified by Young and 
Tisinger (2006), the major concern aroused from ditching traditional news sources 
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for politics delivered within an entertainment framework lies in not receiving 
substantive political information for them to form well-versed political judgments. 
Result of Young and Tisinger’s (   6) study revealed that young viewers, who 
were highly exposed to late-night comedy shows, were more likely to consume 
traditional news sources than non-viewers. The study also showed that people 
who reported learning from late-night comedy shows were more likely to report 
also learning from traditional news sources than people who reported not learning 
from late-night shows (Young & Tisinger, 2006). Young and Tisinger’s (2006) 
study contradict expectations that youth resort to late-night comedy or political 
satire shows for news and political knowledge, but rather study findings indicated 
that they use both political comedy and traditional news shows as complementary 
sources for news. Such findings are also linear to M. A. Baum’s gateway 
hypothesis that posit that soft news encourages more consumption of traditional 
news sources (as cited in Young & Tisinger, 2006). Similarly, Cao’s (  1 ) study 
found that political satire programs, such as The Daily Show, enhance apolitical 
viewers’ attention towards salient issues, which are covered frequently in the 
program. Analysis showed that The Daily Show viewers who scored low on the 
political attentiveness measure were more likely to closely follow the salient 
issues that were regularly covered in the program than their apolitical counterparts 
who didn’t watch The Daily Show (Cao, 2010). This implies that for a political 
satire program such as The Daily Show, which is predominantly a show about 
politics and utilizes more complex type of humor, the show may capture the 
attention of viewers who have little interest in politics and henceforth can direct 
their attention more towards the world of politics (Cao, 2010). Conversely, with 
The Daily Show viewers, who are highly attentive to politics, their exposure to the 
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show didn’t enhance their interest to seek out more about the regularly discussed 
topics in the program more than their non-viewer counterparts (Cao, 2010).  
Argument Scrutiny – Other studies examined the effect of exposure to 
political comedy shows upon viewers’ argument scrutiny. By comparing between 
the effects of exposing participants to humorous political messages (such as with 
late-night shows) and the same message from a non-humorous source, Young’s 
(2008) study found that delivering a political message within a humorous 
framework does have a diluting impact upon individuals’ critical argument 
scrutiny.  
Explanations to why humor reduces argument scrutiny have been 
attributed to various reasons. Citing various sources, Polk, Young and Holbert 
(2009) noted that the negative relation between humor and argument scrutiny has 
commonly been attributed to audience’s inability to counterargue, these include: 
message distraction and resource allocation. The message distraction theory 
basically refers to humor as a potential distraction to a message that reduces 
consumers’ ability to counterargue and increases chances of persuasion (Polk et 
al., 2009). The resource allocation theory states that the process of harmonizing 
incongruent humor references in order to be able to get the joke demands great 
cognitive effort which can take away from other tasks such as, in this case, 
critically evaluating the underlying message of the argument (Polk et al., 2009). 
On the other hand, humor’s reduction of argument scrutiny doesn’t only relate to 
consumers’ cognitive ability but it can also result from message discounting or 
“discounting cue” (Polk et al., 2009, p. 206). The discounting cue makes the 
audience deliberately chose not to scrutinize the humorous message since they 
only regard it as “just a joke” (Polk et al., 2009, p.206). In the fields of advertising 
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and marketing, upon reviewing past literature, various studies have attributed 
humor’s effectiveness upon persuasion to the distraction factor such that putting 
consumers’ in a positive mood distracts them from critically analyzing the 
message content (Sternthal & Craig, 1973). In the case of Polk et al. (2009) study, 
impact of humor complexity (irony versus sarcasm) upon argument scrutiny 
showed that participants who were exposed to the irony clip (complex humor) 
provided weaker counterarguments than those who were exposed to the sarcastic 
clip (simple humor). This indicates that consumers’ counterargument was 
hindered by the complexity of the message (Polk et al., 2009). Polk et al. (2009) 
attributed this finding to the resource allocation theory since argument scrutiny 
was affected by the complexity of the humor. In this case, humor complexity 
resulted in draining individuals’ cognitive capacity (in attempt to understand the 
joke), which in turn hindered their ability to scrutinize the message (Polk, Young 
and Holbert, 2009). Nabi, Gusé and Byrne (2007) also found that humor evocation 
was related to viewers’ argument scrutiny. Their research found that the funnier 
respondents found the message, the greater they deeply processed the message 
and the less likely they counter-argued against it (Nabi, Gusé and Byrne, 2007). 
However, this time the outcome was the result of discounting cue, in other words 
respondents were less likely to take the humorous message seriously and only 
considered it as “just a joke” (Nabi, Gusé and Byrne, 2007, p.38). These findings 
also held true when comparing between humorous versus serious messages (Nabi, 
Gusé and Byrne, 2007). In terms of what moderators affect argument scrutiny 
upon exposure to political comedy shows, Polk et al. (2009) found motivation and 
internal political efficacy as moderators to consumer’s argument scrutiny. Their 
study indicated that higher motivation enhanced counterargument, even though it 
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didn’t improve the quality of the arguments (Polk et al., 2009). When testing 
whether the impact of humor type (irony versus sarcasm) upon argument scrutiny 
is affected by participants’ degree of internal efficacy, Polk et al. (2009) found 
that participants with high internal efficacy provided fewer counterarguments 
when exposed to the simple humor (sarcasm). However, when exposed to the 
complex type humor (irony), they provided multiple compelling counterarguments 
(Polk et al., 2009). Meanwhile, participants with low internal efficacy displayed 
more argument scrutiny towards the sarcastic (simplified) humor than the 
complex (irony) humor (Polk et al., 2009). The authors attributed this finding to 
the probability that those individuals with high internal efficacy are also likely to 
be more knowledgeable and find complex (or ironic) type of humorous arguments 
more thought provoking and worthy of their assessments (Polk et al., 2009). Polk 
et al. (2009) also inferred that since both motivation and ability underlie the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model process. Therefore in can be inferred that ability 
can also encompass political efficacy in the sense that one’s ability to 
counterargue can also stem from one’s trust in his own political judgments and 
competence (Polk et al., 2009). Also, in line with the ELM theory, Zhang’s (1996) 
study on using humor in advertisements found a relation between consumers’ 
‘need for cognition’ (NFC) with humor and argument strength when it comes to 
the persuasiveness of the ad. The ‘need for humor’ construct explains how 
individuals’ different appeal to be involved in issue-relevant arguments can lead 
to differential effects of humor upon persuasion (Zhang, 1996). Therefore, 
consumers who are interested in deeply analyzing (aka processing through the 
central route) the content of the message are likely to form their attitude towards 
the advertised product based on their cognitive evaluation (Zhang, 1996). 
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Conversely, those consumers who are stingy on their cognitive thinking are likely 
to evaluate the advertised product based on affective cues in the ad (aka 
processing through the peripheral route) (Zhang, 1996). The study showed that 
among individuals with low NFC, humor was effective because such group 
spends less cognitive effort on analyzing the message and are likely persuaded by 
the ad’s affective cues, in this case the humor (Zhang, 1996). Meanwhile, high 
NFC individuals are likely to be provoked by the strength of the ad’s argument 
itself rather than by the humor (Zhang, 1996).  Expanding on that subject, Cline 
and Kellaris (1999) investigated the interaction between humor and argument 
strength upon attitudes in which results suggested that humor can foster positive 
attitudes towards advertisements for convenience products particularly when they 
contain weaker arguments. This further supports the notion that humor can trigger 
affective emotions and evaluations from consumers that in turn can boost message 
persuasiveness.   
Evaluation - Various researches tackled the effect(s) of political 
entertainment programs upon viewers’ evaluation of different political and public 
figures and came out with varying results. One of such studies by Baumgartner 
and Morris (2006) focused on what influence The Daily Show has over young 
audiences when it comes to rating political candidates, the electoral system, and 
the news media. The study was conducted during the 2004 US Presidential 
Elections, therefore it focused on examining the influence of The Daily Show 
towards both candidates at that time: George Bush and John Kerry (Baumgartner 
& Morris, 2006). Results of the experimental research indicated that The Daily 
Show had a negative impact upon participants’ evaluation of both candidates, 
while exposure to a regular TV newscast (CBS Evening News in this case) 
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showed no significant influence upon their judgment of both candidates 
(Baumgartner & Morris, 2006). 
Another interesting observation by Baumgartner and Morris (2006) was 
that they found that participants who are frequent newspaper readers displayed 
lower candidate evaluations when compared to non-readers. However, when 
compared to frequent viewers of The Daily Show, newspaper readers didn’t 
display as much cynicism towards the US electoral system and news media as 
with viewers of The Daily Show, which the authors considered as an implication 
for the unique effect that the show’s host, Jon Stewart, might have over viewers 
(Baumgartner & Morris, 2006). Baumgartner’s (   7) study on online political 
humor also yielded similar results showing that regular viewers of political humor 
websites were more likely to negatively evaluate then US President George W. 
Bush when compared to non-viewers.  
Meanwhile, when candidates are not the targets of jokes, and are otherwise 
guests on these political entertainment shows, study results on viewers’ 
evaluations yielded different results. Baum’s (   5) study comparing between the 
effects of exposure to candidate interviews on entertainment talk shows versus on 
traditional news outlets revealed that with high politically aware individuals, high 
exposure to traditional news program’s coverage of the campaign is likely to 
enhance their tendency to support their own party’s candidate and vote for him, 
although to a little extent. However, with low politically aware individuals, 
Baum’s (   5) study results showed a paradoxical effect whereby upon exposure 
to entertainment talk shows, they tend to highly favor and vote for the opposition 
party candidate. Following George W. Bush’s appearance on the Tonight Show 
with David Letterman, Moy, Xenos and Hess (2005) found that viewers were 
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more likely to rate Bush favorably based on his character traits than non-viewers. 
Interestingly, they also found that prior to former US President Bush’s appearance 
on the Tonight Show, he was rated as highly favorable among non-viewers of late-
night comedy shows, however a week after his appearance on the show, viewers 
of the late-night comedy program rated him more favorably than non-viewers 
(Moy et al., 2005).  
These findings resonate with Baum’s (   5) postulation since 
entertainment talk shows focus more on their guest candidates’ personalities and 
less on their political stances, this leaves less heuristic cues for the audience to 
help them establish their own political evaluations. Besides, entertainment talk 
shows tend to represent their guest political candidates’ positive side, to which 
Baum (2005) explained that this would likely enhance their likeability particularly 
among those who are less politically aware. This was true with as shown in 
Young’s (   4) study that found significant difference between viewers with high 
political knowledge and low political knowledge in terms of how they were 
affected by common caricatured traits of candidates on late-night comedy shows. 
Thereby, viewers with low political knowledge evaluation of political candidates 
were consistent with the common caricatured traits on late-night comedy shows 
(Leno and Letterman) (Young, 2004). While viewers with high political 
knowledge didn’t exhibit the same results, though Young noted that they were 
minimal effects and were only limited to Al Gore’s “inspiring” trait (Young, 
2004, p. 13). Similarly, Matthes and Rauchfleisch (2013) study investigating the 
influence of Swiss Late-Night Comedy Show Giacobbo/Müller host Mike 
Müller’s parody of former Swiss minster Hans-Rudolf Merz added that both 
political knowledge and perceived funniness of the show acted as moderators to 
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the evaluation of Merz. In other words, participants with low political knowledge 
who scored high on “perceived funniness” (which refers to the funny rating of the 
parody), were likely to rate the parodied subject positively when it came to rating 
Merz’s global likability, and to a lesser extent negotiation skills and leadership 
skills (Matthes & Rauchfleisch, 2013, p. 609).  
This proposition also indicates that political figures making guest 
appearances on entertainment talk shows would present them in a different light to 
the audience of such talk shows. Thereby this can cause less politically 
knowledgeable individuals to reconsider their evaluations towards them especially 
since they tend to lack on backup political information they can recur to for 
analyzing the discourse. This is the reason why political candidates embrace the 
chance of making an appearance on entertainment talks shows to win over the 
support of viewers that tune into these shows (Baum, 2005). 
Likewise, the effects of self-deprecatory humor on political comedy 
segments yielded similar results. For instance, Baumgartner’s (   7) experimental 
research displaying online humorous segments where former US President George 
Bush was shown making fun of himself was shown to enhance the probability of 
participants positively evaluating him.  
Spillover Effect – Meanwhile, Baumgartner’s (  13) study tackled the 
effects of political entertainment shows in a different manner. Not only did she 
focus on the attitudinal effects of political entertainment shows upon the mocked 
political subjects, but also investigated the potential spillover effect (Baumgartner, 
2013). The spillover effect might also affect viewers’ evaluation towards other 
undisclosed issues within the politics arena, such as political institutions or even 
the news media (Baumgartner, 2013). Her study on the effects of political humor 
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showed that negative evaluations towards the mocked presidential candidates 
resulted in a hidden effect (Baumgartner, 2013). This hidden effect indicates that 
with political based humor targeting presidential candidates can also activate 
negative schemas towards other political matters and cause individuals to rate 
them negatively (Baumgartner, 2013). In the case of Baumgartner’s (  13) study 
the “spillover effect” of viewing political humor videos, centered around mocking 
presidential candidates of the 2008 US Elections, influenced participants to also 
negatively evaluate other “political objects” such as public officials and the 
governments. It also lowered participants’ trust in the news media’s performance 
in covering the election campaigns (Baumgartner, 2013). While Baumgartner’s 
(2013) study focused on the “spillover effect” of political humor in the form of 
online animated video clips, yet she postulated that the viewership of the 
humorous depictions of presidential or public figures on televised political 
entertainment shows can also yield similar results. 
Cynicism (Internal and External Efficacy) – Various studies attention to 
examine the effects of political entertainment shows stem from their interest in the 
democratic role of such shows as well as their increased attention towards how far 
they can impact an individual’s sense of political (external and Internal) efficacy. 
This in turn can hold implications on the likelihood of individuals engaging in 
political activities or not. External Efficacy has been defined by R.G. Niemi, S.C. 
Craig and F. Mattei as “beliefs about the responsiveness of governmental 
authorities and institutions to citizen demands,” while internal efficacy was 
defined by R.G. Niemi et al. as “beliefs about one’s own competence to 
understand, and participate effectively in politics” (as cited in Baumgartner & 
Morris, 2006, p. 352 - 353). The importance of studying the impact of political 
 40 
comedy shows upon cynicism comes from the implications that can be drawn 
from such relationship (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006). For instance, high internal 
efficacy can encourage political participation due to a sense of validation that is 
gratified from viewing The Daily Show (understanding Jon Stewart’s jokes) or 
other similar shows (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006). Furthermore, increased 
cynicism resulting from low external efficacy can enhance critical thinking 
towards political issues (Baumgartner and Morris, 2006). Based on previous 
scholarly work in the field of education, Becker (2014) proposed that it is likely 
that individuals with high internal efficacy to be more willing to enhance their 
political knowledge and to highly trust their own capabilities of understanding and 
participating effectively in politics. However, the problem with low external 
efficacy is that it is likely to dilute political participation among their main target 
(in that case young viewers) resulting from, as remarked by Baumgartner and 
Morris (   6), “a sense of alienation from the political process” (p. 363).  
Baumgartner and Morris (2006) study on The Daily Show effect showed 
that exposure to the program increased cynicism towards the US electoral system 
as well as towards the news media, thus also implying low external efficacy 
among viewers of The Daily Show. Likewise, results from Baumgartner’s (   7) 
study on the effects of online political humor viewing revealed that they lower 
viewers’ external efficacy, as experimental research showed exposure to the 
humorous political clip lowered evaluations and trust towards political institutions 
as well a political leaders. Further examination on which particular medium had 
an impact upon viewers’ political trust, Becker’s (2011) analysis found that only 
network comedy programs (such as Letterman, Leno, Fallon and Kimmel) did 
enhance young viewers’ political trust (or external efficacy). While cable late-
 41 
night comedy programs (such as The Daily Show and The Colbert Report) as well 
as cable and network news programs had no significant impact upon political trust 
(Becker, 2011). Meanwhile, for user-generated political satire, Rill and Cardiel 
(2013) experimental research on the impact of user-generated political satire video 
mocking US Presidential Candidates of 2012 yielded no significant influence 
upon participants’ external efficacy.  
In terms of how political knowledge plays into cynicism, Matthes and 
Rauchfleisch’s (  13) study revealed that participants with high political 
knowledge displayed political cynicism after watching a clip of the program, 
while participants with low political knowledge showed no signs of cynicism after 
exposure.  
Some studies found that political satire programs, such as The Daily Show, 
do enhance viewers’ internal efficacy, meaning that it makes them trust their own 
knowledge and understanding of politics, even though such shows tend to enhance 
cynicism towards the US news media and electoral process (Baumgartner & 
Morris, 2006; Becker, 2011). Baumgartner and Morris (2006) elaborated on the 
possible reason behind this is because The Daily Show attempts to simplify 
politics to its viewers within a comical framework. Baumgartner and Morris 
(   6) explained that such program’s usage of humor can simplify politics by 
attributing the complexities of politics to the shortcomings of incompetent leaders 
rather than an inept public, and also, as pointed by Lyttle and Young, because 
confusing counterarguments are disregarded (as cited in Baumgartner and Morris, 
2006). Meanwhile examining The Colbert Report’s impact on internal efficacy, 
which utilizes a different kind of humor that employs both explicit and implicit 
messages, showed that most participants who were exposed to the show agreed 
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that politics and the government does seem complicated, thus exhibiting low 
internal efficacy (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008). For user-generated political 
satire, Rill and Cardiel (2013) study on the impact of user-generated political 
satire video mocking US Presidential Candidates of 2012 also found no significant 
impact on participants’ internal efficacy. Researchers attributed this finding to the 
likelihood that user-generated political comedy does not focus on transmitting 
information but rather on comedy itself (Rill & Cardiel, 2013).  
Some studies also investigated moderators that play into how far political 
entertainment shows influence viewers’ internal efficacy. For instance, Becker’s 
(2014) study found the following to be significant moderators to internal efficacy: 
demographics (with females reporting to have a more tendency to low internal 
efficacy) and prior exposure to online political comedy, cable news, and network 
news. The study also tackled the newly devised construct Affinity for Political 
Humor (AFPH), which refers to “an individual’s desire to seek out and appreciate 
humorous political content” (Becker, 2014, p.430). She specifically focused on 
one of the four dimensions that AFPH gratifies, which is anxiety reduction 
(Becker, 2014). Anxiety reduction can stem from one’s own perceived inadequacy 
of his own political understanding, and therefore it can be deduced that seeking 
political humor can help reduce such form of anxiety (Becker,   14). Becker’s 
(2014) study found that participants who scored high in the Affinity for Political 
Humor measure (for anxiety reduction) also scored low on internal efficacy thus 
indicating a negative relationship between Affinity for Political Humor and 
internal efficacy. This finding is compatible with Becker’s (  14) interpretation of 
such negative relation that states:  
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Those who seek out political humor as a way to diffuse tension, anxiety, and 
stress should be less likely to feel higher levels of internal political efficacy 
given a lack of comfort with the political environment and the need to seek out 
humor to reduce that tension and apprehension (p. 431).  
 
Furthermore, the study found humor orientation (in relation with viewers’ 
partisan identification) as a moderating factor, whereby humor orientation refers to an 
individual’s preference towards political humor targeting someone he/she supports or 
opposes (Becker, 2014). The study found that preference for a parody clip attacking 
the opposition was positively related to participants’ internal efficacy (Becker, 2014). 
When correlating between Affinity for Political Humor (for anxiety reduction), 
partisan coverage in the political parody, and internal efficacy, Becker’s (  14) 
experiment showed that Republican participants with high AFPH who were exposed 
to the political parody directed at an opposition (Democrats) reported high internal 
efficacy after exposure to the video clip. Becker (2014) explained this outcome as a 
possible result from feeling reassured after finding a critical observation that matched 
with their own political views and partisan standing and thereby gave a boost to their 
own sense of internal efficacy and ability to understand and participate effectively in 
politics. However, for Democrat participants with high AFPH, exposure to the 
political parody directed at an opposition (Republicans) yielded no significant impact 
upon their internal efficacy (Becker attributed it to the context of the study conducted 
after the 2012 US Presidential Elections) (Becker, 2014). Meanwhile, when testing 
for the impact of participants’ reported learning from political parody shows (such as 
Saturday Night Live) upon internal efficacy, Becker’s (  11) study results indicated a 
negative relation between reported political learning from political parody programs 
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and young viewers’ internal efficacy. The author attributed this negative relation 
between political learning from political parody programs and viewers’ internal 
efficacy to the high cognitive expenditure associated with learning that in turn can 
enhance argument scrutiny towards the message (Becker, 2011).  
Studies of political comedy shows also extended to investigating behavioral 
effects. Since not all held attitudes translate to behaviors, scholars were interested in 
what exposure to such programs can tell about viewers’ political activism, particularly 
voting decisions. One of these studies by Baum and Jamison (2006) examined how 
individuals with varying degrees of political awareness utilize news from either hard 
news or soft news programs to help them decide on their voting decisions. The voting 
consistently variable refers to voting for the candidate that matches with an 
individual’s own preferences (Baum & Jamison,    6). The authors particularly 
focused on what factors can lead individuals into voting consistently (Baum & 
Jamison, 2006). This is specifically true when it comes to apolitical individuals since 
voting is the least of their concerns and their lack of political knowledge renders their 
political stances easily malleable under any strong persuasive political messages that 
requires less cognitive effort as a prerequisite to digest the content (such as soft news 
programs). As expected, Baum and Jamison (2006) found higher probability for low-
awareness individuals to vote consistently as their frequency of watching soft news 
programs (day time talk shows such as Oprah Winfrey) increased. While consuming 
hard news programs on the other hand had a small, statistically insignificant effect 
upon their tendency to vote consistently (Baum & Jamison, 2006). Meanwhile, the 
study showed a reverse effect when it comes to highly aware individuals as their high 
consumption of soft news had little effect upon their tendency to voting consistently 
(Baum & Jamison, 2006). It is noteworthy to mention that in Baum and Jamison’s 
 45 
(2006) study, while high exposure to hard news did increase the tendency of highly-
aware individuals to vote consistently, but it wasn’t to the same extent as when 
compared to low awareness individuals high exposure to soft news, or day time talk 
shows in specific.  
 
Metacoverage (Coverage of the News Media)  
 
Political comedy shows’ lampooning didn’t however stop at critiquing the role 
of political figures and institutions, but also went on to critique the role of the news 
media as well. Brewer and Marquardt (2007) particularly used the term metacoverage 
in describing soft news’ coverage of the press. In defining what the term 
metacoverage means, Brewer and Marquardt (2007) used Frank Esser and Paul 
D'Angelo’s definition which comprises of two dimensions. First, “news about the 
role, presence, and behavior of the news media in campaign events and outcomes” (as 
cited in Brewer and Marquardt, 2007, p. 253). Second, “news about the publicity 
efforts of candidates that take place in media formats not traditionally allied to the 
mainstream press but whose strategic intent is to garner coverage from the 
mainstream press” (as cited in Brewer and Marquardt, 2007, p. 253). Political 
entertainment shows can take the role of media watchdogs through metacoverage, 
which in turn can illicit cynicism towards the critiqued (or rather joked about) faults 
of the news media. As clarified through G. Baym’s study, programs’ metacoverage, 
such as The Daily Show, tend to question the dishonest role of the news media for 
focusing on trivial matters instead of significant topics, consequentially this may 
encourage the audience to be skeptical and critical towards the content of the news 
media (as cited in Brewer & Marquardt, 2007). However, how far metacoverage can 
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promote cynicism towards the news media may vary, but Brewer and Marquardt 
(2007) provided a possible explanation of what factors can result in cynicism towards 
the press by quoting Esser & D’angelo’s suggestion. Esser & D’angelo’s suggested 
that different representations of the role of the media can cause different levels of 
cynicism, thereby, those programs that present the media as “actor(s) in a strategic 
game of politics,” may enhance cynicism, while those that present the media as 
supporting “standards of democratic performance” are less likely to enhance cynicism 
(as cited in Brewer & Marquardt, 2007, p. 253). Various studies testing the impact of 
political comedy shows upon viewers indicated that they elicit cynicism towards 
traditional news media’s coverage (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Baumgartner, 
2007). Testing The Daily Show’s impact on cynicism towards the news media, 
Baumgartner and Morris’s (2006) research results showed that the show enhances 
cynicism towards the news media. Similarly, Baumgartner’s (2007) study of the 
effects of online political humor showed that regular viewers of online political 
humor clips tend to poorly evaluate news media coverage of politics than non-
viewers.  
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Political Entertainment Shows 
 
Criticism of Soft News - With the increased popularity of soft news 
programs, various studies began to examine their potential influence upon the 
audience. Humorous messages have been criticized for building passive audience, as 
various studies argued that messages with humorous appeals tend to lower 
counterargument and increase persuasion (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008; Nabi et al., 
2007; Polk et al., 2009; Young, 2008). Besides, humorous messages tend to enhance 
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the likeability of the presenter that puts the receiver in a positive mood and can 
therefore enhance the persuasive effect of the message (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008; 
Nabi et al., 2007; Polk et al., 2009; Young, 2008). Baumgartner and Morris (2008) 
provided an explanation as to why humorous messages can be persuasive since 
viewers become less likely to put “cognitive guards” that are usually activated when 
they feel they are being targeted by an attempted persuasive message, such as with 
marketing and political advertisements. While cynicism can be constructive in 
enhancing critical thinking among viewers, however it can also result in reducing 
political participation among cynical members due to a “sense of alienation from the 
political process” (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006, p. 363).  
Benefits of Soft News (aka Political Satire Programs) - On the other hand, 
M.A. Baum, argued that soft news could actually help “create a more knowledgeable 
citizenry” by facilitating the transmission of political information to inattentive 
viewers who less likely follow traditional news media (as cited in Baumgartner & 
Morris, 2006, p. 34 ). M.A. Baum’s findings revealed that entertainment based shows 
can help educate the inattentive viewer about important information, and that was 
particularly true when it came to educating the US public about foreign policy events 
(as cited in Baumgartner & Morris, 2006). Qin’s (2008) study also supported this 
finding, adding that exposure to soft news and political satire shows can lead to 
incidental learning whereby the inattentive viewer can learn while being entertained.  
M.A. Baum’s study also showed that exposure to presidential candidates 
making guest appearances on entertainment-based talk shows, as part of their 2000 
US presidential elections campaigns, had an influence upon the viewers, particularly 
those who were less interested in politics (as cited in Baumgartner & Morris, 2006). 
Baum’s study revealed that such viewers tend to favor those presidential candidates 
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when they make such appearances on soft news programs (as cited in Baumgartner & 
Morris, 2006). The reason is because soft news programs tend to be more user-
friendly, as described by Baumgartner and Morris (2006), “have less of an edge than 
hard news,” since interviews on entertainment-based talk shows allow for the 
candidates to open up about light, entertaining and personal narratives about their 
lives (p. 342). Baumgartner and Morris (2006) explained that cynicism towards 
politics and low external efficacy, resulting from exposure to political entertainment 
shows, can be beneficial as they can promote critical thinking about politics and can 
therefore have a healthy impact upon democracy. Besides, political entertainment 
shows can increase internal efficacy, meaning that it can enhance viewers’ trust in 
their own knowledge and understanding of politics, which in turn can encourage 
political participation (Baumgartner and Morris, 2006; Becker, 2011).      
 
Explicit vs. Implicit Messages 
 
Other scholars branched out their studies on the effects of political 
entertainment shows on viewers’ perception to include a distinction between the 
impact of explicit versus implicit messages. The complexity of a humorous message 
lies in its degree of clarity, as some forms of political humor, such as satire, can 
contain both explicit and implicit messages (Matthes & Rauchfleisch, 2013). An 
explicit message, as defined by Matthes and Rauchfleisch (2013), is one that “the 
direct evaluative statements a satirist gives,” while an implicit message is “indirect 
and requires cognitive effort and background knowledge” (p. 603). Such degree of 
clarity differs based upon the type of political humor utilized by the program that can 
yield different results upon different viewers with different background knowledge in 
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politics. For instance, if the type of jokes presented is of trivial nature, such as 
mocking the physical attributes of a person or his/her personality traits, such humor 
doesn’t require deep erudition in political knowledge for the viewers to get the joke 
(Matthes & Rauchfleisch, 2013).  
Among such attempts were Baumgartner and Morris’s (    ) study indicated 
that Steven Colbert’s explicit messages that overtly criticize the Democrats did in fact 
have an impact upon participants of the experimental group that were exposed to The 
Colbert Report video clip. Baumgartner and Morris’s (    ) study showed that the 
majority of the experimental group who were exposed to The Colbert Report highly 
evaluated Republicans over Democrats in economic policy, in ability in managing the 
war on terror, and in performing well in the US Congress, just the same as right-wing 
US programs, such as The O’Reilly Factor. However Colbert’s implicit messages 
criticizing Republicans (through parody) did not influence positive evaluations 
towards the Democrats when it came to economic policy and the ability to manage the 
war on terror (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008). Furthermore, The Colbert Report’s 
explicit criticism of the Republicans had an impact upon those who were exposed to it 
as they showed high favoritism towards former US President Bush more than those 
who were exposed to The O’Reilly Factor (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008). This shows 
that The Colbert Report tends to be highly persuasive with its explicit rather than 
implicit messages (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008). Henceforth, Baumgartner and 
Morris (2008) concluded that their research findings support the ELM theory that 
suggests that humor can divert the message from being processed in the recipients’ 
central route causing their positive mood to influence their judgment.  
With more complex types of satire, studies depicted that they tend to be 
influential among people with high political knowledge, and this was supported by 
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Matthes and Rauchfleisch (2013) study, that focused on political parody, by using a 
quasi-experimental approach to instigate the influence of Swiss Late-Night Comedy 
Show Giacobbo/Müller host Mike Müller’s political parody depicting former Swiss 
minster Hans-Rudolf Merz failed negotiations with former Libyan ruler Muammar 
Gaddafi. Results indicated that the parody did have a significant negative impact 
particularly upon participants with high political knowledge as it led them to 
negatively evaluate the parodied subject’s leadership skills, negotiation skills, as well 
as his overall likability (Matthes & Rauchfleisch, 2013). The authors pointed out that 
results of their study of political parody influence on evaluation of political figures 
suggest that “the negative effect of parody becomes stronger with rising levels of 
political knowledge,” (Matthes & Rauchfleisch, 2013, p. 608). On the other hand 
participants who scored low on political knowledge seemed to be positively 
influenced by the parody upon evaluating the parodied subject’s leadership skills, 
negotiation skills, and overall likability (Matthes & Rauchfleisch, 2013). Matthes and 
Rauchfleisch (2013) attributed this finding to the affective, funny impact of the 
explicit message (the parody), which leads low knowledgeable participants to rate the 
parodied subject positively. Matthes and Rauchfleisch (2013) explained that with 
political parody, the audiences are likely to understand and be influenced by the joke 
(or parody) if they’re backed up by high political knowledge. This is because with 
parody it commonly displays negative exaggerated re-enactment of past events or 
situations that require pre-knowledge of that incident in order to get its negative 
connotation (Matthes & Rauchfleisch, 2013). Therefore, it can illicit different 
reactions from viewers depending on their level of political knowledge, as those with 
high political knowledge tend to get the negative references and deep implicit 
message behind the parody (Matthes & Rauchfleisch, 2013). While those with low 
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political knowledge are likely to be influenced superficially by the explicit parts of the 
message that can be entertaining (Matthes & Rauchfleisch, 2013).   
 
Hypotheses 
H1: Young viewers’ evaluation of Egyptian media figures will be negative after 
exposure to the segment of El Bernameg. 
 
H2: Young viewers with high political knowledge will likely rate Egyptian media 
figures negatively after exposure to the segment of El Bernameg? 
 
H3: Participants’ rating of the host’s likability will have an impact their evaluation of 
media figures after exposure to the segment of El Bernameg?  
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Methodology 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The study examined what influence El Bernameg TV Show, being a political 
satire show, has upon young Egyptian viewers. The study particularly focused on how 
young Egyptian viewers, upon watching El Bernameg TV Show, evaluate media 
figures. The experimental study examined how the show’s coverage of the role of 
Egyptian news media figures affects viewers. Besides, the study took into account 
examining if moderating factors, such as political knowledge and El Bernameg host’s 
likability may influence viewers’ evaluations. The study utilized controlled 
experiment particularly a posttest control group design where the experimental stimuli 
was be a 15-minute montaged video clip of 2 episodes of El Bernameg, during its 
third season.   
 
Procedure  
 
To examine the proposed hypotheses and research questions, an experimental 
research was conducted. Participants comprised of a volunteer sample selected from 
college students. The reason behind choosing college students stems from past 
literature and reports that found that youth ranging between ages 18 – 29, are most 
likely to be consumers of political comedy shows. A total of 36 participants were 
asked to participate in the experimental study, and were randomly assigned to one of 
two groups through a coin flip: the experimental group or the control group. The first 
group (n = 18) represents the experimental group whom were exposed to a 15-minute 
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montaged compilation video clip of El Bernameg showcasing Bassem Youssef’s 
lampooning the performances of news media figures. The second group (n = 18) 
comprises the control group whom were exposed to a comedy clip. After exposure to 
the video clip, both groups were asked to answer a post-test questionnaire. There was 
no pre-test in order to avoid subject sensitization towards the post-test. A control 
group was utilized in the study and was compared to the experimental group in order 
to examine whether the causal hypotheses was an outcome from exposure to the 
experimental stimulus (El Bernmaeg clip) or not. Furthermore, the study examined 
moderating factors such as: participants’ political knowledge and likability towards 
the host of El Bernameg.  Participants were asked to sign a consent form and were 
debriefed by the end of the experiment.  
 
Egyptian Media Personalities 
 
Amr Adib 
 
Amr Adib is an Egyptian TV presenter. He hosts Al Qahera Al Youm (Cairo 
Today) talk show that is one of the most popular programs in Egypt. His program 
covers a vast number of topics ranging from arts, culture, sports, politics, and social 
among others. The program was broadcasted on Al Yawm channel that is produced by 
Dubai-based Orbit Showtime Network (OSN) satellite broadcast network. Adib is 
also one of the partners in his family business Al Adib Media Empire, and manages a 
number of their projects including heading Egyptian Nojoom FM private radio 
station. As a TV host, Adib is famous in Egypt for his impulsive and daring speech.  
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Khairy Ramadan 
 
Khairy Ramadan is an Egyptian journalist and TV presenter. He worked in 
various newspapers. However, he rose to prominence upon becoming one of the TV 
presenters for one of the most popular TV talk shows in Egypt Masr El Naharda 
(Egypt Today) until his resignation in   11 following the events of Egypt’s  5th of 
January Revolution. He currently hosts Momken (It Is Possible) TV talk show that 
discusses various topics in politics, social issues, and entertainment. He was one of 
the many Egyptian media personalities whom were attacked for their contradicting 
opinion on former Egyptian President Mubarak’s regime.  
 
Magdy El Galad 
 
Magdy El Galad is an Egyptian journalist and TV presenter. He started his 
career as an investigative journalist for Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram. He later 
became the editor-in-chief of Egyptian independent daily newspaper Al-Masry Al-
Youm. He is the founding editor of Al Watan newspaper. He currently hosts 
investigative TV show Lazem Nefham (We Must Understand) that tackles political, 
social, and economic topics. Prior to the events of the 25th of January revolution in 
Egypt, he displayed opposition against former Egyptian President Mubarak’s regime, 
such as attacking Mubarak’s son, Gamal Mubarak, succession plans. However, he 
then contradicted this notion when he declared in one interview that he support Gamal 
Mubarak and would vote for his presidency of Egypt.   
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Wael El Ebrashy 
 
Wael El Ebrashy is an Egyptian journalist as well as TV presenter. He started 
his professional career as a journalist for Rose Al Yussuf magazine and later was 
assigned as the editor-in-chief for Sawt Al Umma (The Voice of the Nation) Egyptian 
weekly newspaper. He currently hosts Al Ashera Masa’an (10 PM) TV show on 
Egyptian Dream TV channel. His program tackles political, social, and economic 
topics. He was known for his opposition to Mubarak’s regime, a matter that subjected 
him to many trials and arrests.  
 
Lamis El Hadidi 
 
Lamis El Hadidi is an Egyptian TV presenter. She started her professional 
career in 1987 in American TV network NBC as an assistant producer for its Cairo 
bureau and later worked as a reporter for The New York Times. In 1991, she co-
established the first Arab business newspapers called Al Alam Al Youm (The World 
Today) whom she is currently its editor-in-chief since 2005.  She had previously 
worked for Pan Arab TV networks such as Qatari El Jazeera and Saudi MBC and Al 
Arabia. In Egypt, she presented many TV programs such as Feesh w Tashbih (The 
Criminal Records), Nos Al Hakika (Half the Truth), and Men Kalb Masr (From the 
Heart of Egypt). During the events of Egypt’s  5th of January Revolution, El Haidi 
put her then program Men Kalb Masr (From the Heart of Egypt) on halt then resumed 
her coverage of the events after the departure of former Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak. Her reasoning for why she stopped reporting at that time was to avoid 
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submitting false information during these conflicting times. She currently hosts Hona 
Al Asema (The Capital), which is broadcasted on Egyptian satellite TV channel CBC 
and focuses on social and political topics. Throughout her lucrative professional 
career, Lamis El Hadidi interviewed a variety of prominent Arab and International 
public figures including American politician Hilary Clinton, former British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and senior leader of the 
Islamic Palestinian Organization Hamas, Khaled Mashal among many others. In 
2005, she was chosen as the first Arab journalist to join the Young Arab leaders of the 
World Economic Forum in Davos. Throughout her many TV programs, El Hadidi 
covered events through many field trips such as her field trips to Gaza following the 
Israeli attacks of 2008. She was also among the journalists who participated in the 
election campaign of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in the 2005 Egypt 
presidential elections, a matter that she was constantly criticized for by anti-Mubarak 
activists. In her defense, El Hadidi said that her work during the elections was limited 
to dealing with foreign journalists and that she was never a member of the now 
defunct National Democratic Party. Besides her work in TV, she also writes weekly 
columns for Egyptian newspapers Al Masry Al Youm and Al Alam Al Youm.  
 
 
Moataz El Demerdash 
 
Moataz El Demerdash is an Egyptian TV presenter. In Egypt, he presented 
news headlines in English and French, as well as hosted a news analysis TV program 
titled Anba’a w Ara’a (News and Opinions) that was broadcasted on Egyptian 
terrestrial television Channel 2. His prominence also came through presenting the 
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news on Saudi owned MBC channel. Throughout his rich career, he hosted many TV 
shows centering on political, economic, social, and even entertainment topics such as 
90 Dakeeka (90 Minutes) that was broadcasted on Egyptian satellite channel Al 
Mehwar and Masr Al Gadida (New Egypt) on Al Hayat channel. His latest endeavor 
involved a satirical-entertainment TV show titled Akhtar Ragol Fel Alam (The Most 
Dangerous Man on Earth) that he hosted in 2015 on MBC Masr channel.  
 
Tamer Amin 
 
Tamer Amin is an Egyptian TV presenter. He was famously known as the co-
host of Masr El Naharda (Egypt Today) Egyptian TV talk show. He currently hosts 
El Haya Al Youm (Life Today) TV show on Al Hayat Egyptian TV channel that deals 
with political, social, economic issue.  
 
 
Ibrahim Eissa 
 
Ibrahim Eissa is an Egyptian journalist and TV presenter. He also co-founded 
and was the editor-in-chief for Al Dustour (The Constitution) Egyptian weekly 
newspaper in 1995. The paper was known for its outspoken and controversial nature, 
as well as for speaking out against the corruption of Mubarak’s regime. The paper 
also provided diversity in its writing by featuring writers from a wide political 
continuum. Eventually, it was shut down in 1998 due to publishing death threats by 
an Islamist group directed towards three Coptic businessmen. His debut as a TV 
presenter came in    1, through Egyptian channel Dream TV’s Ala El Qahwa (At 
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The Café) program that tackled political and social affairs mixed with satire. The 
program came to an end in 2003 after the network was coerced to shut it due to its 
controversial topics. Over the course of the years, Eissa presented a variety of TV 
shows covering different topics from politics, religious, and social themes, and has 
frequently come under legal actions and silencing due to his outspoken and 
confrontational criticism of the government. Most notably, in 2007, Eissa came under 
fire after he wrote an article pertaining to former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s 
health issues that led to a prison sentence. He was also charged in 2008 under the 
accusation over his article’s consequential damage to national economy following a 
testimony by the Central Bank of Egypt about the withdrawal of $350 million 
investments as a result of his article. After the events of Egypt’s  5th of January 
Revolution, Eissa embarked on new projects including co-founding a new satellite TV 
channel Al Tahrir TV where he also hosted a political TV show called Fel Midan (In 
The Square), but later sold his share of the channel and left it due to financial issues 
with the channel. He also co-launched a daily newspaper also titled Al Tahrir, which 
he currently serves as its editor-in-chief. Eissa was awarded and recognized for his 
contributions to freedom of the press in Egypt.   
 
Description of the Video Clips 
 
For the experimental stimulus, a montaged compilation of clips from El 
Bernameg was presented to the experimental group. The topics addressed in the 
experimental video clip featured Bassem Youssef’s criticism of Egyptian media 
professionalism when covering Egypt’s meeting with Russia and how this meeting 
provoked the US. In this video, Youssef criticized how various Egyptian media 
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personalities dramatized the meeting to depict that such meeting had provoked the 
Obama Administration as a mean to counter the US Aid reduction. The clip also 
showcased an instance where the Egyptian media reported false information 
concerning an arms deal between Russia and Egypt, which at that time wasn’t yet 
confirmed. In another clip from El Bernameg, Youssef tackled the topic of infiltration 
concerning the controversial and now suspended program The Black Box that was 
hosted by Egyptian journalist Abdel Rehim Ali. The program focused on leaked 
private phone calls and messages from major political figures, mostly consisting of 
ousted Muslim Brotherhood figures and activists supporting the 25
th
 of January 
revolution. In this clip, Youssef focused on the different stances of various Egyptian 
media personalities towards the ethical issue of state surveillance. Meanwhile, for the 
control group, they watched a non-political comedy video clip about toddlers.    
 
Hypotheses  
 
H1: Young viewers’ evaluation of Egyptian media figures will be negative after 
exposure to the segment of El Bernameg. 
 
 Evaluation of Egyptian TV Media Figures – participants’ evaluation on 
the performance of news media figures was rated using 14 items from Gaziano and 
McGrath’s (19 6) TV credibility and social concern factors. Respondents were asked 
to evaluate a list of TV hosts that were mocked on El Bernameg based on a 5-point 
scale of bipolar adjectives. The TV hosts whom they were asked to evaluate their 
media performance includes: Amr Adib, Ibrahim Eissa, Khairy Ramadan, Lamees El 
Hadidi, Magdy El Galad, Moataz El Demerdash, Tamer Amin and Wael El Ebrashi. 
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The credibility factor adjectives include: unfair/fair, unbiased/biased, does not tell the 
whole story/tells the whole story, inaccurate/accurate, invades people’s 
privacy/respects people’s privacy, does not watch after viewer’s interests/watches 
after viewer’s interests, is not concerned about the community’s well-being/is 
concerned about the community’s well-being, does not separate fact and opinion, does 
separate fact and opinion, can not be trusted/can be trusted, is concerned about 
making profits/is concerned about the public interest, opinionated/factual. While the 
social concern factors include: does not care what audience thinks/cares what 
audience thinks, does not sensationalize topics/sensationalizes topics, immoral/moral. 
All items were coded the same on a 5-point semantic differential scale so that 5 stands 
for the highest rating and 1 for the lowest rating.   
 
 Evaluation of Egyptian News Media – the study used Baumgartner and 
Morris’s (   6) measures to assess people’s overall evaluation of Egyptian news 
media that encompassed two variables: media trust and media performance.  
Media trust refers to the degree participants trust the news media to deliver 
information fairly and accurately, and was measured by a Likert scale ranging 
between strongly agree to strongly disagree to the following statement: “I trust the 
news media to cover political news fairly and accurately.” While media performance 
refers to the overall evaluation of the news media adequacy to cover politics. It was 
measured by asking “how would you rate the performance of Egyptian media in 
covering politics?” (1 = poor, 2 = fair, 3 = good, 4 = very good, 5 = excellent).   
 
H2: Young viewers with high political knowledge will be likely to negatively rate 
Egyptian media figures after exposure to the segment of El Bernameg? 
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 Political Knowledge – the following questions were asked to test participants’ 
level of political knowledge: “Do you happen to know what political office is now 
held by Ibrahim Mahlab?” “Do you happen to know what political office is now held 
by Sameh Shoukry? “Who holds the position of the interim President for the Republic 
of Egypt in case of vacancy of the presidential office?” “Who is the president of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court?” “Under the constitution, how many years can the 
president of Egypt rule before the end of his term?”  
 
H3: Young viewers’ rating of Bassem Youssef’s likability will have an impact upon 
their evaluation of Egyptian media figures after exposure to the segment from El 
Bernameg.   
 
 Host Likability and Credibility – host likability refers to the degree people 
find the host of El Bernamaeg likable and was measured by a 5-point semantic 
differential scale including: unfriendly/friendly, unlikable/likable, and 
unpleasant/pleasant. While host credibility refers to the degree participants perceive 
the TV host as credible and was measured using Gaziano and McGrath’s (19 6) TV 
credibility factors. Respondents were asked to evaluate the host of El Bernameg, 
Bassem Youssef, based on 11-items through a 5-point scale of bipolar adjectives 
including: unfair/fair, unbiased/biased, does not tell the whole story/tells the whole 
story, inaccurate/accurate, invades people’s privacy/respects people’s privacy, does 
not watch after viewer’s interests/watches after viewer’s interests, is not concerned 
about the community’s well-being/is concerned about the community’s well-being, 
does not separate fact and opinion/does separate fact and opinion, can not be 
 62 
trusted/can be trusted, is concerned about making profits/is concerned about the 
public interest, opinionated/factual.  All items were coded the same on a 5-point 
semantic differential scale so that 5 stands for the highest rating and 1 for the lowest 
rating.    
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Findings 
 
 
Key Measures 
 
Dependent Variables:  
 
1. Evaluation of Egyptian TV Media Figures – participants’ evaluation on the 
performance of news media figures was rated using 14 items from Gaziano and 
McGrath’s (19 6) TV credibility and social concern factors. Respondents were asked 
to evaluate a list of TV hosts that were mocked on El Bernameg based on a 5-point 
scale of bipolar adjectives. The TV hosts whom they were asked to evaluate their 
media performance includes: Amr Adib, Ibrahim Eissa, Khairy Ramadan, Lamees El 
Hadidi, Magdy El Galad, Moataz El Demerdash, Tamer Amin and Wael El Ebrashi. 
The credibility factor adjectives include: unfair/fair, unbiased/biased, does not tell the 
whole story/tells the whole story, inaccurate/accurate, invades people’s 
privacy/respects people’s privacy, does not watch after viewer’s interests/watches 
after viewer’s interests, is not concerned about the community’s well-being/is 
concerned about the community’s well-being, does not separate fact and opinion, does 
separate fact and opinion, can not be trusted/can be trusted, is concerned about 
making profits/is concerned about the public interest, opinionated/factual. While the 
social concern factors include: does not care what audience thinks/cares what 
audience thinks, does not sensationalize topics/sensationalizes topics, immoral/moral. 
All items are coded the same on a 5-point semantic differential scale so that 5 stands 
for the highest rating and 1 for the lowest rating.   
2. Evaluation of Egyptian News Media – the study used Baumgartner and 
Morris’s (   6) measures to assess people’s overall evaluation of Egyptian news 
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media that encompassed two variables: media trust and media performance.  
Media trust refers to the degree participants trust the news media to deliver 
information fairly and accurately, and was measured by a Likert scale ranging 
between strongly agree to strongly disagree to the following statement: “I trust the 
news media to cover political news fairly and accurately.” While media performance 
refers to the overall evaluation of the news media adequacy to cover politics. It was 
measured by asking, “how would you rate the performance of the media in covering 
politics?” (1 = poor, 2 = fair, 3 = good, 4 = very good, 5 = excellent).    
 
Independent Variables: 
 
1. Enjoyment – participants were asked to indicate how far they enjoyed the 
segment by asking them to rate the following statement on a Likert scale “I enjoyed 
watching the video clip” (1 = strongly disagree,   = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 
= strongly agree).    
 
2. Host Likability and Credibility – host likability refers to the degree people 
find the host of El Bernamaeg likable and was measured by a 5-point semantic 
differential scale including: unfriendly/friendly, unlikable/likable, and 
unpleasant/pleasant. While host credibility refers to the degree participants perceive 
the TV host as credible and was measured using Gaziano and McGrath’s (19 6) TV 
credibility factors. Respondents will be asked to evaluate the host of El Bernameg, 
Bassem Youssef, based on 11-items through a 5-point scale of bipolar adjectives 
including: unfair/fair, unbiased/biased, does not tell the whole story/tells the whole 
story, inaccurate/accurate, invades people’s privacy/respects people’s privacy, does 
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not watch after viewer’s interests/watches after viewer’s interests, is not concerned 
about the community’s well-being/is concerned about the community’s well-being, 
does not separate fact and opinion/does separate fact and opinion, can not be 
trusted/can be trusted, is concerned about making profits/is concerned about the 
public interest, opinionated/factual.  All items were coded the same on a 5-point 
semantic differential scale so that 5 stands for the highest rating and 1 for the lowest 
rating.    
 
3. Political Knowledge – the following questions were asked to test participants’ 
political knowledge: “Do you happen to know what political office is now held by 
Ibrahim Mahlab?” “Do you happen to know what political office is now held by 
Sameh Shoukry? “Who holds the position of the interim President for the Republic of 
Egypt in case of vacancy of the presidential office?” “What is the highest limit of per 
capita income in Egypt?” “Who is the president of the Supreme Constitutional 
Court?” “Under the constitution, how many years can the president of Egypt rule 
before the end of his term?”  
 
4. Demographics –included gender (male or female), as well as age (below 18 
years old, 18 – below 20 years old, 20 – below 22 years old, 22 – below 24 years old, 
24 – below 26 years old, 26 – below 28 years old, 28 years old or above).    
 
 
 
 
 
 66 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Gender  
Table 1.1 
Gender 
  
Frequency 
Valid 
Percent 
Valid male 11 30.6 
female 25 69.4 
Total 36 100.0 
 
 
Table 1.2 - Experimental Group 
 
Gender 
  
Frequency 
Valid 
Percent 
Valid male 3 16.7 
female 15 83.3 
Total 18 100.0 
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Table 1.3 - Control Group  
Gender 
  
Frequency 
Valid 
Percent 
Valid 
male 
8 44.4 
female 
10 55.6 
Total 
18 100.0 
 
 
A total sample of 36 participants participated in the study among which 18 
were randomly assigned to the experimental group and 18 to the control group 
through a coin flip. In terms of gender, 30.6% of the sample were males of which 
16.7% were among the experimental group and 44.4% were among the control group. 
Females comprised 69.4% of the sample of which 83.3% were among the 
experimental group and 55.6% were among the control group.  
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Evaluation of Egyptian Media Figures 
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Upon rating the performance of Egyptian TV host Amr Adib, the combined results 
of both the experimental and control groups showed that the majority rated him negatively. 
Amr Adib particularly was rated negatively in the following items: respects people’s 
privacy (M= 2.25, SD= 1.30), separates between fact and opinion (M= 2.33, SD= 1.39), 
trustworthy (M= 2.39, SD= 1.40), concerned about the public interest (M= 2.17, SD= 1.50), 
factual (M= 2.14, SD= 1.38), sensationalizes topics (M= 2.39, SD= 1.40), cares what people 
think (M= 2.44, SD= 1.46), and moral (M= 2.06, SD= 1.19). Therefore, results of Amr 
Adib’s evaluation indicate that he is perceived as disrespectful to people’s privacy, does not 
separate between fact and opinion, untrustworthy, concerned about making profits, 
opinionated, sensationalizes topics, does not care what audience thinks, and immoral.  
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Table 3.2 - Ibrahim Eissa 
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Meanwhile, Ibrahim Eissa had a neutral rating from the majority of the participants.  
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Egyptian TV host Khairy Ramadan received a neutral rating for 7 out of 14 rating 
items, and received negative ratings for 6 out of 14 rating items. Khairy Ramadan was 
negatively perceived as biased (M= 2.36, SD= 1.50), does not tell the whole story (M= 2.53, 
SD= 1.32), does not separate between fact and opinion (M= 2.56, SD= 1.34), concerned 
about making profits (M= 2.50, SD= 1.32), opinionated (M= 2.58, SD= 1.23), and 
sensationalizes topics (M= 2.56, SD= 1.25).  
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Egyptian TV host Lamis El Hadidi was negatively perceived by the majority of the 
participants on all of the 14 rating items. Henceforth, she was negatively rated as unfair 
(M= 2.22, SD= 1.38), biased (M= 2.44, SD= 1.66), does not tell the whole story (M= 2.17, 
SD= 1.38), inaccurate (M= 2.17, SD= 1.3 ), invades people’s privacy (M= 2, SD= 1.26), 
does not watch after viewers’ interests (M= 2.47, SD= 1.44), is not concerned about the 
community’s well-being (M= 2.56, SD= 1.52), does not separate between fact and opinion 
(M= 2.11, SD= 1.26), untrustworthy (M= 2.17, SD= 1.40), concerned about making profits 
(M= 2.11, SD= 1.21), opinionated (M= 2.25, SD= 1.38), sensationalizes topics (M= 2.03, 
SD= 1.18), does not care what people think (M= 2.47, SD= 1.36), and immoral (M= 2.33, 
SD= 1.24).  
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Egyptian TV host Magdy EL Galad, 4 of the participants did know him so they were 
reported as missing values. Therefore, the total sample that rated Magdy El Galad was N= 
32. Out of that sample, the majority were neutral towards his performance except for 2 
rating items where he was rated negatively. Thus, the results indicate that out of the 14 
rating items, Magdy El Galad was perceived as opinionated (M= 2.59, SD= 1.27) and 
sensationalizes topics (M= 2.38, SD= 1.31).  
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Eyptian TV host Moataz El Demerdash, on the other hand, yielded more positive 
feedback from participants from both groups. He was positively rated in 10 out of the 14 
rating itemsthat includes being: fair (M= 3.50, SD= 1), tells the whole story (M= 3.53, SD= 
1), respects people’s privacy, (M= 3.69, SD= 1. 9) watches after viewers’ interests (M= 
3.83, SD=  .97), concerned about the community’s well-being (M= 3.69, SD= 0.86), 
separates between fact and opinion (M= 3.53, SD= 1.06), trustworthy (M= 3.39, SD= 1.18), 
concerned about the public interest(M= 3.14, SD= 1.29), cares what the audience thinks(M= 
3.83, SD= 0.91), and moral (M= 3.86, SD= 0.90).  
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Egyptian TV host Tamer Amin received an overall negative rating from participants 
from both groups whereby he was negatively rated in 11 out of 14 rating items. Participants 
found Tamer Amin to be unfair (M= 2.14, SD= 1.15), biased (M= 2.50, SD= 1.48), does not 
tell the whole story (M= 2.11, SD= 1.09), inaccurate (M= 2.08, SD= 1.  ), invades people’s 
privacy (M= 2.42, SD= 1.34), does not separates between fact and opinion (M= 2.44, SD= 
1.34), untrustworthy (M= 2, SD= 1.10), concerned about making profits (M= 2.28, SD= 
1.23), opinionated (M= 2.06, SD= 1.01), sensationalizes topics (M= 2.42, SD= 1.32), and 
immoral (M= 2.39, SD= 1.29). 
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Table 3.8 - Wael El Ebrashy  
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
  
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
D
i
sa g
r
ee
 
N
e
u
tr a
l 
A
g
re
e
 
S
tr o
n
g
ly
 
A
g
re
e
 
M
ea
n
 
S
td
. 
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
 
F
 
%
 
F
 
%
 
F
 
%
 
F
 
%
 
F
 
%
 
 F
ai
r 1
2
 
3
5
.3
 
4
 
1
1
.8
 
7
 
2
0
.6
 
6
 
1
7
.6
 
5
 
1
4
.7
 
2
.6
5
 
1
.5
0
 
U
n
b
ia
se
d
 
7
 
2
0
.6
 
2
 
5
.9
 
1
1
 
3
2
.4
 
6
 
1
7
.6
 
8
 
2
3
.5
 
3
.1
8
 
1
.4
2
 
T
el
ls
 t
h
e 
w
h
o
le
 
st
o
ry
 
1
1
 
3
2
.4
 
4
 
1
1
.8
 
7
 
2
0
.6
 
7
 
2
0
.6
 
5
 
1
4
.7
 
2
.7
4
 
1
.4
8
 
A
cc
u
ra
te
 
1
1
 
3
2
.4
 
2
 
5
.9
 
1
0
 
2
9
.4
 
6
 
1
7
.6
 
5
 
1
4
.7
 
2
.7
6
 
1
.4
6
 
R
es
p
ec
ts
 
p
eo
p
le
’s
 
p
ri
v
ac
y
 
1
4
 
4
1
.2
 
6
 
1
7
.6
 
4
 
1
1
.8
 
6
 
1
7
.6
 
4
 
1
1
.8
 
2
.4
1
 
1
.4
8
 
W
at
ch
es
 
af
te
r 
v
ie
w
er
's
 
in
te
re
st
s 
9
 
2
6
.5
 
7
 
2
0
.6
 
5
 
1
4
.7
 
8
 
2
3
.5
 
5
 
1
4
.7
 
2
.7
9
 
1
.4
5
 
C
o
n
ce
rn
ed
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
e 
co
m
m
u
n
i
ty
's
 w
el
l-
b
ei
n
g
 
9
 
2
6
.5
 
2
 
5
.9
 
9
 
2
6
.5
 
9
 
2
6
.5
 
5
 
1
4
.7
 
2
.9
7
 
1
.4
2
 
S
ep
ar
at
e
s b
et
w
ee
n
 
fa
ct
 &
 
o
p
in
io
n
? 
1
1
 
3
2
.4
 
7
 
2
0
.6
 
4
 
1
1
.8
 
7
 
2
0
.6
 
5
 
1
4
.7
 
2
.6
5
 
1
.5
0
 
T
ru
st
w
o
r
th
y
 1
2
 
3
5
.3
 
2
 
5
.9
 
7
 
2
0
.6
 
8
 
2
3
.5
 
5
 
1
4
.7
 
2
.7
6
 
1
.5
2
 
C
o
n
ce
rn
ed
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
e 
p
u
b
li
c 
in
te
re
st
 
1
0
 
2
9
.4
 
6
 
1
7
.6
 
1
1
 
2
3
.4
 
3
 
8
.8
 
4
 
1
1
.8
 
2
.5
6
 
1
.3
3
 
 83 
F
ac
tu
al
 
1
0
 
2
9
.4
 
8
 
2
3
.5
 
8
 
2
3
.5
 
5
 
1
4
.7
 
3
 
8
.8
 
2
.5
0
 
1
.3
1
 
D
o
es
 n
o
t 
se
n
sa
ti
o
n
al
iz
e 
to
p
ic
s 
1
3
 
3
8
.2
 
1
0
 
2
9
.4
 
6
 
1
7
.6
 
4
 
1
1
.8
 
1
 
2
.9
 
2
.1
2
 
1
.1
5
 
 C
ar
es
 
w
h
at
 
p
eo
p
le
 
th
in
k
? 9
 
2
6
.5
 
5
 
1
4
.7
 
7
 
2
0
.6
 
7
 
2
0
.6
 
6
 
1
7
.6
 
2
.8
8
 
1
.4
7
 
M
o
ra
l 
8
 
2
3
.5
 
6
 
1
7
.6
 
5
 
1
4
.7
 
9
 
2
6
.5
 
6
 
1
7
.6
 
2
.9
7
 
1
.4
7
 
 
For Egyptian TV host Wael El Ebrashy, 2 of the participants did know him so they 
were reported as missing values, so the total sample that rated him was N= 34. Wael El 
Ebrashy received a neutral rating by the majority of the participants, yet received the lowest 
ratings in the following4 items: invades people’s privacy (M= 2.41, SD= 1.48), concerned 
about making profits (M= 2.56, SD= 1.33), opinionated (M= 2.50, SD= 1.31), and 
sensationalizes topics (M= 2.12, SD= 1.15).  
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Table 3.9 - Evaluation of Egyptian Media Figures 
 
Egyptian TV 
Hosts 
Mean Standard Deviation  
Experimental 
Group 
Control Group 
Experimental 
Group 
Control Group 
 
AmrAdib 
2.06 2.67 1.21 1.19 
 
Ibrahim Eissa 
2.78 2.94 1.26 1.06 
 
Khairy Ramadan 
2.50 3.00 1.20 1.28 
 
Magdy El Galad 
2.72 3.29 1.32 0.91 
 
Lamis El Hadidi 
2.17 1.94 1.34 1.11 
 
Moataz 
ElDemerdash 
3.50 3.72 0.86 0.83 
 
Tamer Amin 
2.17 2.33 1.20 0.97 
 
Wael El Ebrashy 
 
2.72 2.50 1.41 1.46 
Total  (N) 18 18 18 18 
 
On the other hand, by comparing the means of Egyptian media figures between the 
experimental and the control group, there was a difference in how both groups perceived 
the proposed Egyptian TV hosts. As demonstrated in table 3.9, participants in the 
experimental group were likely to negatively evaluate AmrAdib(M= 2.06, SD= 1.21)and 
Khairy Ramadan(M= 2.50, SD= 1.20) compared to the control group whom were neutral 
towards both TV hosts. While Wael El Ebrashy was perceived negatively by the control 
group (M= 2.50, SD= 1.46) compared to the experimental group. However, both groups 
unanimously evaluated Lamis El Hadidi(experimental M= 2.17, SD= 1.34; control M= 1.94, 
SD= 1.11)and Tamer Amin (experimental M= 2.17, SD= 1.20; control M= 2.33, SD= 0.97) 
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negatively, while both groups positively evaluated Moataz El Demerdash (experimental M= 
3.50, SD= 0.86; control M= 3.72, SD= 0.83).  
 
 
Table 3.10 - Evaluation of Egyptian Media Figures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Egyptian TV 
Hosts 
Mean Standard Deviation   
Experimental 
Group 
Control Group 
Experimental 
Group 
Control Group 
2.58 2.80 0.96 0.66 
Total  (N) 18 18 18 18 
 
 
The overall mean of evaluation of Egyptian media figures indicates that the 
experimental group was more likely to rate Egyptian TV hosts negatively (M= 2.58, SD= 
0.96) than the control group (M= 2.80, SD= 0.66).  
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Overall Evaluation of Egyptian News Media 
Table 4.1 
Question  
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagre
e 
Neutral Agree 
Strongl
y Agree Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
F % F % F % F % F % 
I trust Egyptian 
news media to 
cover political 
news fairly and 
accurately. 
15 
41.
7 
11 
30.
6 
8 
22.
2 
1 2.8 1 2.8 1.94 1.01 
 
 
Table 4.2 
Question  
Poor Fair Good 
Very 
Good 
Excelle
nt Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
F % F % F % F % F % 
How would you 
rate the 
performance of 
Egyptian news 
media in covering 
politics? 
20 
55.
6 
4 
11.
1 
9 25 2 5.6 1 2.8 1.89 1.14 
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Table 4.3 
Overall Evaluation of Egyptian News Media 
 
Mean Standard Deviation  
Experimental 
Group 
Control Group 
Experimental 
Group 
Control Group 
 
I trust Egyptian 
news media to 
cover political 
news fairly & 
accurately 
 
1.94 1.94 1.06 1.00 
 
How would you 
rate the 
performance of 
Egyptian news 
media in 
covering 
politics? 
 
1.78 2.00 1.22 1.08 
Total  (N) 18 18 18 18 
 
Upon examining how both groups would evaluate the overall role of Egyptian news 
media, both groups equally displayed distrust towards Egyptian news media in covering 
political news fairly and accurately (M= 1.94). However, there was a difference between 
both groups when evaluating the overall performance of Egyptian news media in covering 
politics, whereby the majority of the experimental group rated the performance of Egyptian 
news media poorly (M= 1.78, SD=1.22), while the control group gave it a fair rating (M= 2, 
SD= 1.08).  
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Evaluation of Bassem Youssef  
 
Table 5.1 
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Part of the study investigates Egyptian TV host Bassem Youssef likability in order 
to test whether it can have an effect over participants’ evaluation of Egyptian media figures 
and Egyptian media in general. A Likert scale of 14 items indicated that the majority of 
both the experimental and control groups rated him positively. Youssef was rated positively 
as fair (M= 4.53, SD= 0.91), likable (M= 4.67, SD= 0.59), pleasant (M= 4.50, SD= 0.74), 
fair (M= 4.19, SD= 1.21), tells the whole story (M= 3.58, SD= 1.40), accurate (M= 4.08, 
SD=  .97), watches after viewers’ interests (M= 3.83, SD= 1.28), concerned about the 
community’s well-being(M= 4.17, SD= 1.16), separates between fact and opinion (M= 
3.67, SD= 1.35), trustworthy (M= 3.92, SD= 1.27), and concerned about the public interest 
(M= 3.67, SD= 1.39). However, Youssef received a negative rating when it comes to 
respecting people’s privacy (M= 2.25, SD= 1.46).  
 
 
 
 90 
Table 5.2 
Evaluation of Bassem Youssef  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bassem Youssef 
 
Mean Standard Deviation  
Experimental 
Group 
Control Group 
Experimental 
Group 
Control Group 
3.87 3.71 0.53 0.62 
Total  (N) 18 18 18 18 
 
When examining the means for each of the groups separately, both the experimental 
and the control groups positively rated the overall performance of Bassem 
Youssef(experimental M= 3.87, SD= 0.53; control M= 3.71, SD= 0.62). This suggests that 
Youssef is highly likable among this age group regardless if they had seen the experimental 
video (from El Bernameg video montage) or not.  
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Media Usage 
 
Table 6 
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As shown in table 6, patterns of media use among participants of both groups 
suggests that they highly depend on online news websites (M= 3.58, SD= 1.27) and social 
networks (M= 4.61, SD= 0.77) to receive news.  
 
 
Hypotheses Testing  
 
H1: Young viewers’ evaluation of Egyptian media figures will be negative after 
exposure to the segment of El Bernameg.  
 
The first hypothesis H1 suggests that participants in the experimental group who 
watched a video montage from El Bernameg satirical TV show, hosted by Bassem Youssef, 
are more likely to rate Egyptian TV hosts negatively than participants in the control group 
who watched an unrelated comedy video clip prior to answering the survey. However, 
results from an independent sample t-test suggested that there is no statistical significance 
between the experimental group (M=2.58, SD= 0.96) and the control group (M=2.80, SD= 
0.66), (t (34)= -0.823, p>.05). It is noteworthy to mention that even though there is no 
significant difference between the experimental and the control group, there is a small 
difference between the means of both groups which signifies that the experimental group 
were likely to negatively rate the proposed Egyptian media figures than the control group 
whom were likely to give them a neutral rating.  
Furthermore, upon comparing between the experimental and control group in how 
they evaluate how far they trust Egyptian news media to cover political news fairly and 
accurately, the independent sample t-test indicated that there is no statistical significance 
between both groups (t (34)= 0, p> .05). Both groups in fact had the same mean value (M= 
1.94), which shows that both expressed a lack of trust towards the Egyptian news media in 
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covering political news fairly and accurately. Besides, the independent sample t-test found 
no significance between the experimental and control group in how they rate the overall 
performance of Egyptian news media in covering politics (t (34)= -0.579, p> .05). Yet, it is 
also noteworthy to mention, although a slight difference exists between both groups 
whereby the mean of experimental group (M= 1.78, SD= 1.22)shows that they poorly rated 
the overall performance of Egyptian news media when it comes to covering politics, while 
the mean of the control group (M= 2, SD= 1.08) shows that they gave a fair rating.  
 
H2: Young viewers with high political knowledge will likely rate Egyptian media 
figures negatively after exposure to the segment of El Bernameg? 
 
Upon examining whether participants’ level of political knowledge test had an 
impact upon their evaluation of Egyptian media figures, the chi-square test showed no 
significant impact of level of political knowledge upon evaluation of Egyptian media 
figures for both the experimental group (χ2 (12, N= 18) = 0.345, p > .05) and the control 
group (χ2 (15, N= 18) = 0.384, p > .05).  
Political knowledge level was also not a significant variable in predicting 
participants’ overall evaluation of Egyptian news media performance as no significant 
relation was found between participants’ level of political knowledge and their trust in 
Egyptian news media covering political news fairly and accurately for either the 
experimental group (χ2 (3, N= 1 ) =  .655, p > . 5) or the control group (χ2 (3, N= 18) = 
0.389, p > .05). Besides, no significant relation was found between participants’ level of 
political knowledge and their rating of the performance of Egyptian news media in covering 
politics for either the experimental group (χ2 (4, N= 18) = 0.213, p > .05) or the control 
group (χ2 (3, N= 18) = 0.398, p > .05). 
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H3: Young viewers’ rating of the Bassem Youssef’s likability will have an impact upon 
their evaluation of Egyptian media figures after exposure to the segment of El 
Bernameg?  
 
When testing to examine whether Bassem Youssef rating had an impact upon 
participants’ evaluation of Egyptian media figures, no significant difference was found 
between the two variables for either the experimental group (r= 0.010, p > .05), or the 
control group (r= 0.422, p > .05). Therefore, the test found no correlation between Bassem 
Youssef’s likability rating and participants’ evaluation of Egyptian media figures.  
Also no significant relation was found between participants’ ratings of Bassem 
Youssef and their trust in Egyptian news media to cover politics fairly and accurately 
(experimental r= 0.301, p > .05, and control group r= 0.075, p > .05), or with their rating of 
the overall performance of Egyptian news media in covering political topics (experimental 
r= 0.146, p > .05, and control group r= 0.107, p > .05).   
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Discussion  
 
The study sought to investigate how political satire shows can impact young 
Egyptian viewers’ evaluation towards Egyptian media figures, as well as how they 
generally perceive the performance of Egyptian news media when it comes to 
covering politics. The study employed an experimental approach in order to examine 
whether political satire shows had a significant effect upon how young Egyptian 
viewers perceive Egyptian TV talk show hosts. The study particularly focused on 
Egyptian media’s performance in covering political topics, and therefore the rating of 
Egyptian media figures came in the context of Egyptian TV talk show hosts who 
cover political and social issues. The study also examined how other factors can come 
into play in affecting how young Egyptian viewers perceive the performance of 
Egyptian media overall and Egyptian media figures in covering politics. Such factors 
include: participants’ level of political knowledge and likability towards the TV host 
of the political satire program (in this case Bassem Youssef). The study tackled 
Bassem Youssef’s political satire program El Bernameg seeing how it popularized 
political satire within Egypt.   
As a political satire show, the program wasn’t limited to satirizing the role of 
political figures and institutions only, but also engaged in the process of 
metacoverage, or the act of critiquing the role of news media. As seen through 
previous studies by Baumgartner and Morris (2006) and Baumgartner (2007) 
metcoverage did enhance cynicism towards the news media. Therefore the first 
hypothesis (H1) proposed that young viewers’ evaluation of Egyptian media figures 
will be negative after exposure to the segment of El Bernameg. However, when it 
comes to Egyptian young audience, no significant effect emerged from watching a 
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video montage from El Bernameg ridiculing several Egyptian TV talk show hosts. On 
the other hand, it is noteworthy to mention that there was a slight effect in favor of the 
experimental group that implied that they had a tendency to negatively rate the 
proposed Egyptian media figures over participants from the control group, although 
this effect was not statistically significant. This outcome can be likened to Hollander’s 
(2005) study findings that indicated that late night comedy shows (such as Jay Leno 
& David Letterman) helped enhance recognition towards the message. In a similar 
way, viewing El Bernameg video clip could have improved recognition towards the 
proposed Egyptian TV talk show hosts, whereby recognition refers to viewers’ low 
interest/involvement towards the message, as defined in Hollander’s (   5) study. In 
other words, viewing the program could have acted as a reminder to the inadequacies 
of Egyptian TV hosts when covering political topics. This outcome can be attributed 
to recognition rather than recall (which refers to high involvement and interest 
towards the message) since with televised medium, recognition or peripheral 
interest/involvement towards the message is likely to take place, unlike with print 
medium that likely requires high cognitive effort to read and process the message, as 
explained by Hollander (2005). 
Upon further inspection, comparison between the experimental and the control 
group on how they rated each Egyptian TV host showed that not all TV hosts were 
perceived the same. For instance, the experimental group negatively perceived Amr 
Adib and Khairy Ramdan, while the control group was neutral towards both hosts. On 
the other hand, Wael El Ebrashy was negatively perceived by the control group, 
unlike the experimental group. Both groups unanimously negatively evaluated both 
Lamis El Hadidi and Tamer Amin, while Moataz El Demerdash was positively 
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evaluated from both groups.  Finally, for Ibrahim Eissa and Magdy El Galad, results 
showed that both groups were neutral towards the performance of both TV hosts.   
In terms of how far participants trust Egyptian news media to cover political 
news fairly and accurately, the study found no significant difference between both the 
experimental and control group. In fact, both had the same mean value that indicated 
that both the experimental and the control group showed lack of trust towards 
Egyptian news media when it comes to coverage of news fairly and accurately. 
Likewise, no statistical significance was found between the experimental and control 
group upon rating the overall performance of Egyptian news media in covering 
politics. However, there was a slight effect in favor of the experimental group 
indicating that the experimental group was more likely than the control group to 
negatively rate the overall performance of Egyptian news media in covering politics. 
The study results indicate that young Egyptian viewers in general negatively 
perceive the performance of Egyptian media figures and of Egyptian news media in 
covering political topics. Although statistical tests showed an insignificant difference 
between the experimental and the control group when it comes to evaluating the role 
of Egyptian media figures, however a small difference indicated that the experimental 
stimuli, or the video segment from El Bernameg, did have an impact upon how 
participants evaluated the role of Egyptian TV hosts which was on par with the 
show’s negative depictions of these TV hosts. Secondly, participants under the 
experimental condition were likely to give a poor rating to the overall performance of 
Egyptian news media in covering politics, while the control group gave it a fair rating, 
although it has to be noted that this difference between the experimental and control 
group was a small, statistically insignificant.  
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The second hypothesis (H2) suggested that participants with high political 
knowledge would likely negatively evaluate Egyptian media figures. Past literature 
have shown that political knowledge can act as a moderator to communication effects 
suggesting that high politically knowledgeable audience are likely to be resistant to 
the persuasive effects of the message. As shown in Young’s (   4) study, participants 
with low political knowledge evaluation of political candidates were consistent with 
the common caricatured traits on late-night comedy shows unlike participants with 
high political knowledge. Likewise, Matthes & Rauchfleisch (2013) found an inverse 
relation between participants’ political knowledge and their evaluation of the parodied 
subject indicating that participants with high political knowledge negatively evaluated 
the parodied subject, and vice versa. This was however untrue in this study for both 
participants who watched El Bernameg video clip and the funny video clip, as 
statistical tests showed that viewers’ level of political knowledge was not a predictor 
to how they evaluate Egyptian media figures.   
Political knowledge level also was not a predictor to predicting participants’ 
evaluation of their trust towards Egyptian news media in covering politics fairly and 
accurately or the overall performance of Egyptian media in covering politics, and that 
was true for both the experimental and the control group.  
The third hypothesis (H3) suggested that the likability of El Bernameg TV 
host Bassem Youssef will influence how participants rate Egyptian media figures. 
However, study results have shown that Youssef’s likability rating was not a 
significant predictor to how participants evaluate Egyptian media figures. This shows 
that with young Egyptian participants, perception towards the host of the political 
satire show (Bassem Youssef) does not influence how they perceive and consequently 
rate the performance of Egyptian media figures.  
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Study results have also shown no significant impact of Bassem Youssef’s 
likability rating upon how participants’ trust in Egyptian news media in covering 
politics fairly and accurately or their overall rating towards the performance of 
Egyptian news media in covering politics. That outcome was applicable for both the 
experimental and the control group.   
 
Limitations 
 
The study had its limitations. First, the sample size comprised of a total of N 
36 participants, which could have possibly resulted in the statistically small and 
insignificant differences when comparing the research results between the 
experimental and the control group. A small sample was employed due to the 
experimental nature of the study and due to the short study period. For future studies, 
it is recommended to assign a larger sample size for both the experimental and the 
control group. Second, the study utilized an experimental method, which is essential 
to establish a causal relationship. However, the main problem with the experimental 
approach is the artificiality of the experimental environment whereby the unnatural 
setting can alter the behavior under investigation. In other words, reactions to the 
experimental stimuli might not be achievable the same way in the real world 
(Baumgartner & Morris, 2008). It is recommended to use qualitative methods, besides 
the experimental approach, such as in-depth interviews to get a better understanding 
of the reason behind participants’ responses.  
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Recommendations 
 
The topic of political comedy programming contains many angles to explore 
in order to learn more about its effects and how adding humor to the formula can 
render such shows different from traditional news media. While various studies exist 
on the topic of political humor from different parts of the world, the topic remains 
relatively new in Egypt, therefore it is recommended that further research to be 
conducted on the different aspects of political humor and satire in order to learn more 
about it within the Egyptian context. For future studies, it is recommended to further 
investigate the effects of political entertainment shows upon other aspects such as 
political knowledge and whether such programming can lead to incidental learning as 
proposed by Susu Qin’s (    ) study. Another angle to be tackled is the effect of 
political entertainment shows upon argument scrutiny in terms of whether exposure to 
such shows dilute viewers’ critical thinking therefore causing them to be more 
susceptible to agreeing with the message. Future studies should also consider the 
different types of humor and its impact upon audience such as the impact of parodies 
and self-deprecatory humor, as well as the impact of explicit versus implicit type of 
humor, how will it fare with Egyptian viewers in comparison to their US counterparts. 
Future studies should also look into the effect of political entertainment shows upon 
audiences’ political internal and external efficacy.  
In the past few years, Egypt has seen two major political events including the 
25th of January Revolution and the 30th of June Revolution as a result of 
deterioration in the political, economic, and social conditions in the country. These 
uprisings against corruption has been affiliated to the effort of Egyptian youth, who in 
a way, helped mobilize the public to take a stand and voice their disdain against the 
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corruption of the regime at that time with the help of social media websites, such as 
Facebook and Twitter. Moreover, the Egyptian news media at that time suffered from 
no credibility due to its pro-Mubarak stance and for underestimating the demands of 
the protestors and vilifying them.  
Bassem Youssef’s political satire show El Bernameg had sprouted during the 
events of Egypt’s  5th of January revolution as means to not only critic the regime, 
but also to criticize the role of Egyptian media in covering the events. In that way, 
Youssef’s content served as a mouthpiece for the Egyptian public’s opposition against 
the corruption of the Egyptian regime, as well as against the poor performance of the 
Egyptian news media in transmitting an honest depiction of the events at that time.  
The outcome of this study’s experimental methodology has shown that 
participants, whom represent Egyptian youth, displayed similar results when it comes 
to their evaluation of Egyptian media personalities and Egyptian news media for both 
the experimental and the control group. A study by Naila Hamdy (2013) showed that 
participants’ overall evaluation of credibility of Egyptian media showed that Egyptian 
Television in particular was rated as less fair than other forms of Egyptian media. 
This indicates that their evaluation did not stem from Youssef’s political satire 
approach critiquing the role of Egyptian media personalities and Egyptian media in 
general, but rather Youssef’s rhetoric came as extension to the general Egyptian 
public opinion disdain towards the corruption of the Egyptian media. Although at the 
time the experimental research was conducted Youssef’s El Bernameg TV show was 
cancelled, yet participants from both the experimental and the control group had still 
remembered him, as study results indicated their positive evaluations towards 
Youssef, which is likely due to Youssef’s political satire rhetoric echoing their 
general disapproval of the performance of the Egyptian news media.  
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Based on the ELM theory, the study findings show that participants, of both 
the experimental and the control group, had predominantly negative perception 
towards Egyptian media personalities and Egyptian news media in general. Therefore, 
their questionnaire evaluations indicated that they were likely to base their evaluations 
of the mentioned Egyptian TV presenters on the central route. This is likely due to, as 
mentioned earlier, the negative preconception that the Egyptian pubic, particularly 
Egyptian youth, had established during Egypt’s  5th of January revolution, whereby 
Egyptian media did not represent true facts of the events. Thus, no significant 
difference were found between the experimental and the control group because they 
were likely to have utilized the central route of processing, basing their evaluation of 
the performance of Egyptian media personalities and Egyptian news media in general 
on their negative preconceptions that were likely formed during the events of Egypt’s 
 5th of January revolution. Accordingly, Bassem Youssef’s success as a political 
satirist can be attributed to his views that supported and reiterated the public’s 
frustration from the poor performance of Egyptian news media.  As also indicated by 
Petty, Briñol, and Priester (2009) that although message processing that occurs 
through the central route requires high cognitive effort, yet it can still be biased by a 
person’s own predispositions or previously held attitudes or information.   
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The topic of effects of political entertainment programs has attracted a lot of 
scholarly attention in order to understand how political humor in media can render 
complex political content differently from traditional news media. The present study 
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investigated the impact of political entertainment shows upon young Egyptian 
audience taking Bassem Youssef’s political satire show El Bernameg as an example 
to test its potential effects upon young Egyptian viewers’ evaluation of Egyptian 
media personalities as well as their overall impression of the performance of Egyptian 
news media in covering politics. The study also investigated the impact of 
moderators, such as political knowledge and likability towards the host of El 
Bernameg, which can impact viewers’ evaluation towards the media content. The 
study utilized an experimental methodology using a posttest control group design. 
Research results have shown that young Egyptian audience generally lacks trust in the 
performance of Egyptian news media when it comes to covering political issues. The 
study also showed that a small (yet insignificant) difference between the experimental 
and control group that implicate that the program helped participants in the 
experimental group to recall the inadequacies of Egyptian media figures and the 
performance of Egyptian news media in covering political topics. This outcome, 
although statistically insignificant, yet still reveals that such programming is palatable 
among young viewers. The study also showed that Bassem Youssef had a great 
appeal between both groups when asked to rate his performance. With this study 
offering a head start to learn more about the impact of political entertainment shows 
upon Egyptian audience, it remains to see how such programming can affect other 
aspects such as political education, argument scrutiny or internal and external 
efficacy.   
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Appendix A 
 
Survey  
 
1. I enjoyed watching today’s video clip  
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Neutral  Agree 
 Strongly 
Agree 
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2. How would you rate the following Egyptian media figures? 
 
a. Amr Adib  
 
 1 2 3 4 5  
unfair      fair 
unbiased      biased 
does not tell 
the whole story 
     
tells the 
whole story 
inaccurate      accurate 
invades 
people’s 
privacy 
     
respects 
people’s 
privacy 
does not watch 
after viewer’s 
interests 
     
watches 
after 
viewer’s 
interests 
is not 
concerned 
about the 
community’s 
well-being 
     
is concerned 
about the 
community’
s well-being 
does not 
separate fact 
and opinion 
     
does 
separate fact 
and opinion 
cannot be 
trusted 
     
can be 
trusted 
is concerned 
about making 
profits 
     
is concerned 
about the 
public 
interest 
opinionated      factual 
sensationalizes 
topics 
     
does not 
sensationaliz
e topics 
does not care 
what audience 
thinks 
     
cares what 
audience 
thinks 
immoral      moral 
 
 114 
b. Ibrahim Eissa  
 
 1 2 3 4 5  
unfair      fair 
unbiased      biased 
does not tell 
the whole story 
     
tells the 
whole story 
inaccurate      accurate 
invades 
people’s 
privacy 
     
respects 
people’s 
privacy 
does not watch 
after viewer’s 
interests 
     
watches 
after 
viewer’s 
interests 
is not 
concerned 
about the 
community’s 
well-being 
     
is concerned 
about the 
community’
s well-being 
does not 
separate fact 
and opinion 
     
does 
separate fact 
and opinion 
cannot be 
trusted 
     
can be 
trusted 
is concerned 
about making 
profits 
     
is concerned 
about the 
public 
interest 
opinionated      factual 
sensationalizes 
topics 
     
does not 
sensationaliz
e topics 
does not care 
what audience 
thinks 
     
cares what 
audience 
thinks 
immoral      moral 
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c. Khairy Ramadan    
 
 1 2 3 4 5  
unfair      fair 
unbiased      biased 
does not tell 
the whole story 
     
tells the 
whole story 
inaccurate      accurate 
invades 
people’s 
privacy 
     
respects 
people’s 
privacy 
does not watch 
after viewer’s 
interests 
     
watches 
after 
viewer’s 
interests 
is not 
concerned 
about the 
community’s 
well-being 
     
is concerned 
about the 
community’
s well-being 
does not 
separate fact 
and opinion 
     
does 
separate fact 
and opinion 
cannot be 
trusted 
     
can be 
trusted 
is concerned 
about making 
profits 
     
is concerned 
about the 
public 
interest 
opinionated      factual 
sensationalizes 
topics 
     
does not 
sensationaliz
e topics 
does not care 
what audience 
thinks 
     
cares what 
audience 
thinks 
immoral      moral 
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d. Lamees El Hadidi 
 
 1 2 3 4 5  
unfair      fair 
unbiased      biased 
does not tell 
the whole story 
     
tells the 
whole story 
inaccurate      accurate 
invades 
people’s 
privacy 
     
respects 
people’s 
privacy 
does not watch 
after viewer’s 
interests 
     
watches 
after 
viewer’s 
interests 
is not 
concerned 
about the 
community’s 
well-being 
     
is concerned 
about the 
community’
s well-being 
does not 
separate fact 
and opinion 
     
does 
separate fact 
and opinion 
cannot be 
trusted 
     
can be 
trusted 
is concerned 
about making 
profits 
     
is concerned 
about the 
public 
interest 
opinionated      factual 
sensationalizes 
topics 
     
does not 
sensationaliz
e topics 
does not care 
what audience 
thinks 
     
cares what 
audience 
thinks 
immoral      moral 
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e. Magdy El Galad  
 
 1 2 3 4 5  
unfair      fair 
unbiased      biased 
does not tell 
the whole story 
     
tells the 
whole story 
inaccurate      accurate 
invades 
people’s 
privacy 
     
respects 
people’s 
privacy 
does not watch 
after viewer’s 
interests 
     
watches 
after 
viewer’s 
interests 
is not 
concerned 
about the 
community’s 
well-being 
     
is concerned 
about the 
community’
s well-being 
does not 
separate fact 
and opinion 
     
does 
separate fact 
and opinion 
cannot be 
trusted 
     
can be 
trusted 
is concerned 
about making 
profits 
     
is concerned 
about the 
public 
interest 
opinionated      factual 
sensationalizes 
topics 
     
does not 
sensationaliz
e topics 
does not care 
what audience 
thinks 
     
cares what 
audience 
thinks 
immoral      moral 
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f. Moataz El Demerdash  
 
 1 2 3 4 5  
unfair      fair 
unbiased      biased 
does not tell 
the whole story 
     
tells the 
whole story 
inaccurate      accurate 
invades 
people’s 
privacy 
     
respects 
people’s 
privacy 
does not watch 
after viewer’s 
interests 
     
watches 
after 
viewer’s 
interests 
is not 
concerned 
about the 
community’s 
well-being 
     
is concerned 
about the 
community’
s well-being 
does not 
separate fact 
and opinion 
     
does 
separate fact 
and opinion 
cannot be 
trusted 
     
can be 
trusted 
is concerned 
about making 
profits 
     
is concerned 
about the 
public 
interest 
opinionated      factual 
sensationalizes 
topics 
     
does not 
sensationaliz
e topics 
does not care 
what audience 
thinks 
     
cares what 
audience 
thinks 
immoral      moral 
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g. Tamer Amin    
 
 1 2 3 4 5  
unfair      fair 
unbiased      biased 
does not tell 
the whole story 
     
tells the 
whole story 
inaccurate      accurate 
invades 
people’s 
privacy 
     
respects 
people’s 
privacy 
does not watch 
after viewer’s 
interests 
     
watches 
after 
viewer’s 
interests 
is not 
concerned 
about the 
community’s 
well-being 
     
is concerned 
about the 
community’
s well-being 
does not 
separate fact 
and opinion 
     
does 
separate fact 
and opinion 
cannot be 
trusted 
     
can be 
trusted 
is concerned 
about making 
profits 
     
is concerned 
about the 
public 
interest 
opinionated      factual 
sensationalizes 
topics 
     
does not 
sensationaliz
e topics 
does not care 
what audience 
thinks 
     
cares what 
audience 
thinks 
immoral      moral 
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h. Wael El Ebrashy     
 
 1 2 3 4 5  
unfair      fair 
unbiased      biased 
does not tell 
the whole story 
     
tells the 
whole story 
inaccurate      accurate 
invades 
people’s 
privacy 
     
respects 
people’s 
privacy 
does not watch 
after viewer’s 
interests 
     
watches 
after 
viewer’s 
interests 
is not 
concerned 
about the 
community’s 
well-being 
     
is concerned 
about the 
community’
s well-being 
does not 
separate fact 
and opinion 
     
does 
separate fact 
and opinion 
cannot be 
trusted 
     
can be 
trusted 
is concerned 
about making 
profits 
     
is concerned 
about the 
public 
interest 
opinionated      factual 
sensationalizes 
topics 
     
does not 
sensationaliz
e topics 
does not care 
what audience 
thinks 
     
cares what 
audience 
thinks 
immoral      moral 
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3. Please check the choice that represents how you feel towards Egyptian news media:  
a. I trust Egyptian news media to cover political news fairly and accurately. 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Neutral  Agree 
 Strongly 
Agree 
 
b. How would you rate the performance of Egyptian news media in covering 
politics?  
 
 Poor  Fair  Good  Very Good  Excellent  
 
  
 122 
4. How funny would you rate the video clip that you have just viewed? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5  
Not funny      Funny 
Not Amusing      Amusing 
Not 
Humorous 
     Humorous 
Not 
Entertaining 
     Entertaining 
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5. On the following scale, how would you rate the host of El Bernameg TV show, 
Bassem Youssef? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5  
Unfriendly      Friendly 
Unlikable      Likable 
Unpleasant      Pleasant 
 
 1 2 3 4 5  
unfair      fair 
unbiased      biased 
does not tell 
the whole 
story 
     
tells the 
whole 
story 
 
inaccurate      accurate 
invades 
people’s 
privacy 
     
respects 
people’s 
privacy 
does not 
watch after 
viewer’s 
interests 
     
 
watches 
after 
viewer’s 
interests 
 
is not 
concerned 
about the 
community’s 
well-being 
     
 
is 
concerned 
about the 
communit
y’s well-
being 
 
does not 
separate fact 
and opinion 
     
 
does 
separate 
fact and 
opinion 
 
cannot be 
trusted 
     
 
can be 
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trusted 
 
is concerned 
about 
making 
profits 
     
 
is 
concerned 
about the 
public 
interest 
 
opinionated      factual 
 
6. How frequently do you refer to the following media to receive your daily 
news? 
 
 Never 
Less than 
once a 
week 
Once a 
week 
A few 
times a 
week 
Daily 
National TV 
News  
     
Satellite TV 
News 
     
National TV 
Talk Shows  
     
Satellite TV 
Talk Shows  
     
Governmental 
Newspapers 
     
Partisan 
Newspapers  
     
Private-Owned 
Newspapers 
     
Online News 
Websites  
     
Social 
Networks 
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7. Do you happen to know what political office is now held by Ibrahim Mahlab? 
 
 
 Prime Minister of Egypt 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs  
 Minister of Defense  
 I don’t know  
 
8. Do you happen to know what political office is now held by Sameh Shoukry? 
 
 Minister of Education 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 Minister of Justice 
 I don’t know 
 
9. Who holds the position of the interim President for the Republic of Egypt in case 
of vacancy of the presidential office? 
 
 Head of the Supreme Constitutional Court 
 The Prime Minister of Egypt  
 The Speaker of the People’s Assembly 
 I don’t know  
 
 
10. Who is the president of the Supreme Constitutional Court? 
 
 Ahmed El Zend  
 Adly Mansour 
 Tahany El Gebaly  
 I don’t know  
 
 
11. Under the constitution, how many years can the president of Egypt rule before the 
end of his term? 
 
 1 year  8 years  
 4 years  I don’t know  
 
12. Gender 
 
 Male  
 
 Female 
 
 
 
 
 
13. Age 
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 Below 18 years old  
 18 – below 20 years old  
 20 – below 22 years old  
 22 – below 24 years old  
 24 – below 26 years old 
 26 – below 28 years old 
 28 years old or above      
 
14. Would you like to add any remarks? 
 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
________________________________________ 
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